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ABSTRACT

McCulloch v. Maryland, echoing Alexander Hamilton nearly thirty years earlier, claimed
of the word “necessary” in the Necessary and Proper Clause: “If reference be had to its use, in
the common affairs of the world, or in approved authors, we find that it frequently imports that
one thing is convenient, or useful . . . to another.”

Modern case law has translated that

understanding into a rational-basis test that treats the issue of necessity as all but nonjusticiable;
The Supreme Court has never found a congressional law unconstitutional on the ground that it
was not “necessary . . . for carrying into Execution” a federal power.
Marshall, and Hamilton before him, were simply wrong in their empirical claim about the
meaning of “necessary,” We show, using founding-era dictionaries, an extensive corpus linguistic
study of founding-era sources, and intertextual and intratextual analysis, that the original meaning
of “necessary” cannot plausibly be equated with “convenient,” “useful,” “conducive to,” or
“rational.” The case against Marshall and Hamilton’s linguistic claim is simply overwhelming.
That does not mean that executory laws are “necessary” only if “indispensable,” as the
State of Maryland, echoing Thomas Jefferson, argued in McCulloch. While that strict meaning
finds support in many of the sources that we examine, it does not constitute the best meaning in
the specific context in which the term “necessary” appears in the Constitution: A clause defining
the incidental powers of agents. In that setting, familiar from the law of agency, a better fit is
James Madison’s view that executory laws are necessary if they exhibit “a definite connection
between means and ends,” showing “some obvious and precise affinity” between the laws and the
powers which they implement. In modern parlance drawn from another context, one might say
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that executory laws are necessary if they are congruent and proportional to the task to which they
are put.
Our principal goal in this article is not to defend this Madisonian view of necessity but
simply to show that Marshall and Hamilton’s linguistic claim about the meaning of “necessary”
is false. We do not offer a comprehensive account of the original meaning of the Necessary and
Proper Clause beyond this simple observation. But because McCulloch’s dictum has become
canonical, we examine some of the leading cases involving federal power to see whether
substituting a congruence-and-proportionality test for the test of usefulness, convenience, or
rationality would make a large difference in outcomes.

Holding all other elements and

applications of doctrine equal, we find only a few cases in which getting right the original meaning
of “necessary” might make a difference – and those cases are already widely seen as anomalous
under current doctrine. Nonetheless, there is value in getting such things right, including focusing
attention on the extent to which the Necessary and Proper Clause rather than the Commerce
Clause is the key to understanding the scope of federal power.
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Introduction

It is often said that “necessity is the mother of invention.” 1 In the context of U.S.
constitutional law, one perhaps should instead say that necessity is the product of invention – an
invention of Chief Justice John Marshall and Alexander Hamilton, who jointly created a meaning
for the word “necessary” that has profoundly shaped, or perhaps misshaped, the course of
American legal development.
Under Article I, section 8, clause 18 of the Constitution, Congress is granted power to make
all laws “which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” 2 its own enumerated
powers and the enumerated powers granted by the Constitution to non-congressional actors. 3
While the clause drew the ire of Antifederalists during the 1787-88 ratification process, who
dubbed it “the Sweeping Clause,” 4 the limits of its grant of power were first meaningfully tested

* Clayton J. & Henry R. Barber Professor, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law; Visiting Professor of Law, Yale
University, Fall 2013-2022.
** J.D., Yale Law School, 2022.
*** William Fairfield Warren Distinguished Professor, Boston University School of Law.
1

The precise origin of the phrase appears to be unknown, but some version of it has been around for at least several
thousand years in multiple cultures. See The saying 'Necessity is the mother of invention' - meaning and origin.
(phrases.org.uk).
2

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.

3

The clause gives Congress power to execute “the foregoing Powers [enumerated in the first seventeen clauses of
Article I, section 8], and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof.” Id.

4

See, e.g., Pierce Butler, Objections to the Constitution (Aug. 30, 1787), in SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND’S THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 249, 249 n.1 ((James H. Hutson ed., 1987) (describing George
Mason’s objection to the “sweeping clause”). The Federalists, for whatever reason, accepted the Antifederalists’ label,
see, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 203 Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (Alexander Hamilton) (referring to “the sweeping
clause, as it has been affectedly called), which was the standard term for the clause into the twentieth century. See 1
FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 525 (1901). As far as we can tell,
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in court in 1819 in McCulloch v. Maryland. 5

In finding that Congress had power to charter a

national bank, Chief Justice John Marshall famously said of the word “necessary”: “If reference
be had to its use, in the common affairs of the world, or in approved authors, we find that it
frequently imports that one thing is convenient, or useful . . . to another.” 6 That formulation has
driven constitutional law for more than two centuries, validating a wide variety of “convenient” or
“useful” policy inventions by Congress, including the federal power to print money and
widespread federalization of criminal law, education, and many other intricate and local aspects
of manufacturing, mining, and agriculture. In modern parlance, laws under current doctrine are
deemed “necessary” for effectuating federal powers if they employ “rational means” 7 to achieve
their ends. And if a means-ends connection between federal laws and federal powers requires only
a rational basis, it is not surprising that no law has ever been found unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court on the ground that it was not “necessary” for carrying into effect federal powers.
Chief Justice Marshall did not uniquely invent this account of “necessary” as meaning
“convenient” or “useful.” It originated with Alexander Hamilton during his defense of the first
Bank of the United States in 1791. In defending the original bank bill, Hamilton wrote: “It is a
common mode of expression to say, that it is necessary for a government or a person to do this or

the modern name for the clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, did not appear in a federal court opinion until 1926.
See Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 596 (1926). We use the modern label in this article for ease of exposition.
5

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, (1819). To be sure, at least some of the discussion in McCulloch
was foreshadowed in 1805 in United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 396 (1805). See infra --.
6

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 413.

7

Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004).
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that thing, when nothing more is intended or understood, than that the interests of the government
or person require, or will be promoted by, the doing of this or that thing.” 8
Two decades ago, one of us unscientifically tested Hamilton’s and Marshall’s linguistic
assertion against an old-style CD-ROM database of founding-era materials and found exactly no
usages of “necessary” meaning, or even approximating, “convenient” or “useful.” 9 This article
looks more systematically at the linguistic claim that underlies one of our most venerable
constitutional doctrines. We use an extensive look at founding-era dictionaries and the new
technique of corpus linguistics to examine, with considerably more sophistication than one of us
could bring to bear two decades ago, a large database of uses to prove conclusively that the framing
generation – both in ordinary discourse and in the specialized context of the Necessary and Proper
Clause -- meant “necessary” to mean something considerably stronger than “convenient” or
“useful.” Hamilton’s and Marshall’s empirical claim about linguistic usage was a pure invention.
Our principal thesis in this article is a negative one: Hamilton and Marshall were wrong
about the ordinary uses of “necessary” in the founding era. That does not prove that “necessary”
means “indispensable,” as was claimed by Thomas Jefferson in the Washington Administration10
and by the State of Maryland in McCulloch. 11 Indeed, while that narrow definition is considerably
closer to the mark than is the Hamilton/Marshall invention, it overstates the case – as James

8

Final Version of an Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank, in 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 97, 102 (Harold X. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1965)
.
9
See Gary Lawson, Discretion as Delegation: The “Proper” Understanding of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 235, 245 n.56 (2005) (concluding that “Hamilton’s famous observation . . . appears to be blather”).
10

See Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Establishing a National Bank, in 19 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 275, 278 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1974) (claiming that laws are only “necessary” if they are “means without
which the grant of the power would be nugatory”).
11

See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 367 (argument of Mr. Jones) (defining “necessary” as “indispensably
requisite”")
.
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Madison was quick to recognize. While the parties in McCulloch presented two extreme positions
to the Court, Madison had already realized that neither of those extremes was correct.
In the congressional debates on the first bank bill, Madison rejected the strict Jeffersonian
line on necessity, 12 but he also warned against the Hamiltonian view:
The essential characteristic of the Government, as composed of limited and
enumerated powers, would be destroyed: If instead of direct and incidental means,
any means could be used, which in the language of the preamble to the bill, “might
be conceived to be conducive to the successful conducting of the finances; or might
be conceived to tend to give facility to the obtaining of loans. 13
In the wake of McCulloch nearly three decades later, Madison more precisely formulated his
account of necessity as requiring “a definite connection between means and ends,” in which laws
are connected to executed powers “by some obvious and precise affinity.” 14 This view, as we
explain in more detail in Part III, finds support in Samuel Johnson’s 1755 Dictionary of the English
Language, which defined “necessary” as meaning: “1) Needful; indispensably requisite; 2) Not
free; fatal; impelled by fate; 3) Conclusive; 4) Decisive by inevitable consequence.”15 Johnson’s
work was the leading dictionary of the English language available to the Framers of the U.S.
Constitution. It provides no support for the Hamilton/Marshall position, nor do any of the other

12

See 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 417
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., 1836).
13

1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1947-49 (1791).

14
Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 447, 448
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1908)
15

SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 189 (1755):
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dictionaries available during the Founding era, which either repeat or reinforce Johnson’s
definition.
This Madisonian account of “necessary,” which one Supreme Court Justice has recognized
as the best account of the term’s original meaning, 16 finds ready expression in an already-existing
doctrine developed for a different constitutional provision. In City of Boerne v. Flores, 17 the
Supreme Court interpreted the word “appropriate” in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 18 to
require “a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the
means adopted to that end." 19

Subsequent cases make clear that this congruence and

proportionality test is considerably stricter than a rational basis test, as any number of
congressional laws have been found unconstitutional under it. 20 While two of us have expressed
some doubts about whether this is the best account of what “appropriate” means in the Civil War
amendments, 21 it is an excellent fit with the word “necessary” in the Necessary and Proper Clause.
At the very least, it is a far better fit than is the Hamilton/Marshall formulation. The Court could
easily adapt this well-developed test to the necessity of executory laws.

16

See Sabri, 541 U.S. at 612-13 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).

17

521 U.507 (1997).

18

See U.S. CONST. amend. IV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article”). See also id. amend. XIII, § 2 (“Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation”)l; id. amend. XV, § 2 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation”); id. amend. XIX, § 2 (“Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation”).
19

521 U.S. at 520 (“There must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied
and the means adopted to that end. “).
20

See Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland, 566 U.S. 30 (2012); Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expenses Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).

21

See STEVEN GOW CALABRESI & GARY LAWSON, THE U.S. CONSTITUTION: CREATION, RECONSTRUCTION, THE
PROGRESSIVES, AND THE MODERN ERA 876 (2020). See also Coleman v .Court of Appeals of Maryland, 566 U.S. 30,
44 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring the judgment) (“our ‘congruence and proportionality’ jurisprudence . . . makes no
sense”).
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We emphasize again the narrowness of our claim.

We are not offering here a

comprehensive account of the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause. That project would
require, at a minimum, consideration of the meaning of “necessary,” of “proper,” of the phrase
“necessary and proper” as a unified whole, of the phrase “for carrying into Execution,” of the
agency-law origins of the clause and the distinction between principal and incidental powers, and,
as John Mikhail has trenchantly pointed out, 22 of the meaning of the enigmatic phrase “all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States.” Those are all worthy
topics for discussion, 23 but we do not discuss them here. We concentrate only on the implausibility
of interpreting “necessary” as “convenient” or “useful.”
We also emphasize that we are not claiming that McCulloch was wrongly decided, that it
should be overruled, or that all, or even most, of the many decisions relying either expressly or
implicitly on the famous McCulloch dictum should be overruled. The meaning of "necessary" is
only one piece of those decisions – and that is assuming that one regards the original meaning of
“necessary” as a relevant input to constitutional decision-making. Cases decided under a broad
understanding of “necessary” might come out the same way under a narrower understanding, either

22

See John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 GEO. L.J. 1045 (2014).

23

On “proper,” see Lawson, supra note 9 Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger; The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power:
A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993). On the meaning and significance
of “for carrying into Execution,” see Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1867 (2005); David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress’ Power Regarding the Judicial Branch, 1999 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 75, 172-74. On the agency-law origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, see Robert G. Natelson, The Legal
Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in GARY LAWSON, GEOFFREY P. MILLER, ROBERT G. NATELSON & GUY
I. SEIDMAN, THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 52 (2010). On the possible meanings of powers
vested in the government of the United States, see Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Authors’ Response: An Enquiry
Concerning Constitutional Understanding, 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491, 509-12 (2019); Mikhail, supra note 22.
For attempts at an integrated account of the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, see GARY LAWSON & GUY
SEIDMAN, “A GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY”: UNDERSTANDING THE FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION 76-104 (2017); Randy
E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183 (2003); John Mikhail,
The Constitution and the Philosophy of Language: Entailment, Implicature, and Implied Powers, 101 VA. L. REV.
1063 (2015).
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because the law in question satisfies a “congruence and proportionality” test, can be justified under
some clause other than the Necessary and Proper Clause, does not warrant overruling even if wrong
as an original matter, or any or all of the above. In Part VI, we survey some leading cases to see
how they would fare under a congruence and proportionality test for necessity, holding all other
elements of doctrine as applied in those decisions stable. That discussion does not proclaim any
of those decisions to be correct or incorrect, for the same reasons that we do not issue an ultimate
judgment on McCulloch There are simply too many factors that enter into those kinds of
judgments for us to address here. Instead, we aim simply to fix a linguistic mistake, with whatever
consequences

do

or

do

not

flow

from

that

correction..

The article is divided into six parts, plus a brief conclusion. Part I addresses the history of
the Necessary and Proper Clause, which has been dealt with at great length elsewhere. Part II
explores the Supreme Court’s decision in McCulloch v. Maryland and its aftermath. Part III
examines the meaning of “necessary” provided in founding-era dictionaries, which makes clear
that “necessary” in 1788 did not mean “convenient” or “useful,” much less “rational.” Part IV
consists of an original corpus-linguistic analysis of the textual and linguistic arguments on which
the McCulloch account of “necessary” rests. We briefly explore the history, strengths, and
weaknesses of corpus-linguistic methods for this kind of inquiry. Then, three separate corpus
analyses will test: (1) the similarity of the words identified as synonyms of “necessary” by the
McCulloch Court; (2) Marshall’s assertion that adverbs frequently qualified the meaning of the
word “necessary”; and (3) Marshall’s claim that the phrase “necessary and proper” as a whole
meant something less than “indispensable.” Ultimately, the article concludes that the word
“necessary,” as used in the Necessary and Proper Clause, did not mean “convenient” or “useful”
at the time the Constitution was ratified or at the time McCulloch was decided. Part V looks at

11

how “necessary” was used in other documents in the founding era, such as state constitutions and
instruments of agency. Unsurprisingly, these other sources confirm our findings about the term’s
public meaning. Part VI briefly reviews some leading cases involving congressional power to see
if they would have come out the same way if – holding all other elements of doctrine as applied in
those cases constant -- “necessary” had been read as being “needful and proper” or “congruent and
proportional” rather than as meaning “convenient” or “useful” or “rational.” We find a small
number of cases in which that substitution would likely make a difference, though those cases are
already seen as somewhat anomalous even under current law.:
Thus, we inject fresh empirical data into the 233-year-old debate over the meaning of one
of the Constitution’s most important words.

I. The Drafting and Ratification of the Necessary and Proper Clause

A. The New Learning

For many years, conventional wisdom held that the Necessary and Proper Clause was “a
masterpiece of enigmatic formulation,” 24 such that “no one, including the constitutional framers,
knows the point of the phrase ‘necessary and proper.’ ” 25 And, indeed, if one looks solely at the
sources typically consulted for the drafting history of constitutional provisions – the records of the
Constitutional Convention and the ratification debates – one will likely come away disappointed.

24

JOSEPH M. LYNCH, NEGOTIATING THE CONSTITUTION: THE EARLIEST DEBATES OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 4 (1999).

25

Mark A. Graber, Unnecessary and Unintelligible, 12 CONST. COMMENTARY 167, 168 (1995).

12

A parade of major scholars into the twenty-first century lamented the lack of information about
the clause’s origins.

Bernard Siegan wrote that “the accounts of the 1787 Constitutional

Convention are silent on the meaning of the necessary and proper power.” 26 Randy Barnett noted:
“The Necessary and Proper Clause was added to the Constitution by the Committee of Detail
without any previous discussion by the Constitutional Convention. Nor was it the subject of any
debate from its initial proposal to the Convention’s final adoption of the Constitution.”27 Mark
Graber said that the Committee of Detail which drafted the clause “”gave no hint why it chose the
language it did.” 28 One of us has argued that the words “necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution” are obviously more restrictive than Congress’s power “[t]o exercise exclusive
Legislation in all Cases whatsoever” 29 over the District of Columbia or Congress’s power “to
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States,” 30 but how much more restrictive the Necessary and Proper Clause
is than are the District of Columbia or Territory Clauses he did not say. 31 Moreover, the phrase
“necessary and proper” appeared in only one pre-Convention state constitution, in a provision
dealing with emergency powers that authorizes the legislature in case of invasion “to adopt such
other measures as may be necessary and proper for insuring continuity of the government . . . .” 32

26

BERNARD H. SIEGAN, THE SUPREME COURT’S CONSTITUTION: AN INQUIRY INTO JUDICIAL REVIEW AND ITS IMPACT
ON SOCIETY 1 (1987).

27

Barnett, supra note 23, at 185.

28

Graber, supra note 25, at 168.

29

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.

30

Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.

31

See CALABRESI & LAWSON, supra note 21, at 623.

32

MASS. CONST. OF 1780, art. LXXXIII.
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Over the past two decades, however, the antecedents of the Necessary and Proper Clause
have come into focus as scholars have looked beyond and beneath the standard sources. The most
important development was Robert Natelson’s insight that the Necessary and Proper Clause was a
standard clause in eighteenth-century agency instruments addressing the incidental powers of the
agents – the agents in this case being the various entities empowered in the Constitution by “We
the People.” 33 “Necessary and proper” was one entry on a menu of options for describing the
extent of an agent’s incidental powers that would go along with the express powers granted to the
agent in the governing instrument. 34 Because the Committee of Detail was composed of four
lawyer and a businessman, all of whom would be familiar with incidental powers clauses in agency
instruments, and because members of the founding-era public often had extensive experiences as
agents or principals in their day-to-day lives, it is not surprising that the clause’s language would
seem familiar and thus generate little discussion. 35
This private-law agency account of the Necessary and Proper Clause dovetails with publiclaw accounts linking the Necessary and Proper Clause to basic administrative law principles
regarding subdelegated powers 36 and founding-era corporate law, 37 all of which concern “public

33

U.S. CONST. Preamble. See Robert G. Natelson, The Agency Law Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 55
CASE WESTERN RESERVE L. REV. 243 (2004). In roughly contemporaneous work, Natelson developed the predicate
idea that the Constitution is an agency, or fiduciary, instrument. See Robert G. Natelson, Judicial Review of Special
Interest Spending: The General Welfare Clause and the Fiduciary Law of the Founders, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POLITICS
239 (2007); Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077 (2004). Gary Lawson
and Guy Seidman subsequently authored a book-length development of the idea of a fiduciary Constitution. See
LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 23.
34

See Natelson, supra note 23, at 68-80 (describing at least five different formulae for expressing an agent’s incidental
powers).
35

See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 23, at 86-86.

36

See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Necessity, Propriety, and Reasonableness, in LAWSON, MILLER, NATELSON &
SEIDMAN, supra note 23, at 120.
37

See Geoffrey P. Miller, The Corporate Law Background of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in LAWSON, MILLER,
NATELSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 23, at 144.
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agency law: the application of agency law principles to public actors.” 38 In 2010, one of us helped
combine these three lines of analysis into a book 39 showing that, instead of springing from nowhere
out of the Committee of Detail, the Necessary and Proper Clause had a wide range of antecedents
that would have been well known to a founding-era audience.
More recently, John Mikhail has explored the role of James Wilson as the principal drafter
of the clause, 40 though Wilson’s strong nationalist views may not have been wholly representative
of the views of the broader public. He has also documented how the phrase “necessary and proper”
appeared prominently in non-legal discourse. 41 This is a valuable addition to the corpus of work
on the clause’s origins, but the key question is not how “necessary” (and “necessary and proper”)
would be understood in a private letter but rather how the phrase would be understood in the
specific context of an agency instrument that enumerates principal powers of an agent. It is in that
respect that it makes sense to describe the word “necessary” in Article I, section 8 as a “term of
art.” 42 This emphatically does not mean that the word, or other terms in the Necessary and Proper
Clause, are terms “which only a trained lawyer or someone with specialized legal knowledge
would be able to use or interpret correctly.” 43 The agency-law usage of “necessary” was a term of

38

Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Raiders of the Lost Clause: Excavating the Buried Foundations of the Necessary
and Proper Clause, in LAWSON, MILLER, NATELSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 23, at 1, 6. Note that corporations in the
eighteenth century were public entities operating under government charters. General incorporation statutes, which
treat corporations as a private business form, were a nineteenth-century development. See Miller, supra note 37, at
147-48.
39

See LAWSON, MILLER, NATELSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 23.

40

See Mikhail, supra note 22, at 1096-1103.

41

See id. at 1114-21

.
42

Natelson, supra note 23, at 119.

43

Mikhail, supra note 22, at 1114.
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art that would be widely understood both in its meaning and as a term of art in the specific context
in which it appeared. As one of us has explained:
Would reasonable eighteenth-century observers who were not lawyers actually
understand the basic character of fiduciary law? Of course they would. In an era in
which sudden deaths were frequent, communication was uncertain, and lawyers
were scarce, ordinary people would be unlikely to get through life without being
agents, principals, or both. “Anyone employed in business or commerce would be
familiar with, inter alia, managers and factors. Anyone who owned land would
likely be familiar with stewards. And virtually everyone would be familiar with
executors and guardians.” 44
Thus, while the Necessary and Proper Clause received relatively little attention at the Philadelphia
Constitutional Convention, that lack of attention is not surprising.

B. Ratification and Representations

Matters heated up a bit during the ratification debates. Some Antifederalists were alarmed by
the Necessary and Proper Clause. 45 Interestingly, the focus of attention did not seem to be on the
word “necessary.” Rather, Antifederalists mainly worried that the clause carried implied powers

44

Gary Lawson, The Fiduciary Social Contract, 38 SOCIAL PHIL. & POL’Y 25, 37 n.47 (2021) (quoting LAWSON &
SEIDMAN, supra note 23, at 55).
45

See Natelson, supra note 23, at 94-96 (cataloguing and summarizing the Antifederalist claims about the clause);
John T. Valauri, Originalism and the Necessary and Proper Clause, 39 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 773, 805 (2013) (“AntiFederalist opponents of the proposed Constitution reserved special scorn for provisions of that document such as the
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(or too many implied powers) and made Congress the sole judge of its own authority. The second
claim was obviously wrong, as the clause specifies an objective test rather than, as with some other
clauses, authorizing whatever laws Congress deems necessary and proper. 46 The first claim was
correct in principle. The whole point of the Necessary and Proper Clause is to confirm and clarify
the scope of Congress’s incidental, and therefore implied, powers. That means that there are, in
fact, implied federal powers. Determining the scope of those implied powers is a topic for another
day. For present purposes, what matters is that very little in the Antifederalist critique of the clause
during the ratification debates casts light on the meaning of the word “necessary.”
Nor did the Federalist response say much specifically dealing with the meaning of
“necessary.” Alexander Hamilton and James Madison—who would soon thereafter part company
over the Necessary and Proper Clause’s meaning—both attempted to downplay the
Antifederalists’ fears under the shared pseudonym “Publius.” In the Federalist Papers, they
claimed that the Necessary and Proper Clause’s purpose was to prevent the opponents of the
national government from stymieing its efforts to execute its delegated powers, 47 not to expand
those powers. 48 In fact, Hamilton insisted that “the constitutional operation of the intended
government would be precisely the same” with or without the Clause, describing it as “perfectly
harmless.” 49

46

This message was repeated practically universally by Federalists, with “no

For a detailed critique of this Antifederalist claim, see Lawson & Granger, supra note 23, at 76-85.
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See THE FEDERALIST NO. 33 (Alexander Hamilton) (“But SUSPICION may ask, Why then was it introduced? The
answer is, that it could only have been done for greater caution, and to guard against all cavilling refinements in those
who might hereafter feel a disposition to curtail and evade the legitimate authorities of the Union.”); see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison) (“Had the convention . . . adopt[ed] the second article of Confederation, it is
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construing the term ‘EXPRESSLY’ with so much rigor, as to disarm the government of all real authority whatever, or
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THE FEDERALIST NO. 33 (Alexander Hamilton).
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disagreement as to the meaning of the Clause expressed by supporters of the Constitution” at the
ratifying conventions. 50 For the purposes of understanding the original public meaning, it is
significant that anyone who took the Federalists at their word would have believed that the Clause
only permitted the exercise of powers “incidental” to those expressly delegated. 51 However, the
precise linguistic meaning of the phrase “necessary and proper” did not factor into this dialogue in
a meaningful way.

C. The Bank of the United States Bill of 1791

The meaning of “necessary” took center stage in Congress and the executive department
just three years after the Constitution was ratified. The fledgling United States had experienced an
economic crisis in the 1780s, from which it was just emerging in President George Washington’s
first term. 52 The federal government was bankrupt, the Continental currency was worthless, and
the States had adopted uncooperative economic policies. 53 Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary
of the Treasury, served as the most strenuous advocate of creating a Bank of the United States. He
considered the establishment of a national bank to be a key aspect of his broader effort to “create
an engine of economic growth for the United States.” 54 The proposed bank was largely modeled
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Barnett, supra note 23, at 187.
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Id. See also Natelson, supra note 23, at 97-108 (exhaustively cataloguing the Federalist reprsentations regarding
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off the successful Bank of England 55 (perhaps more so than the unsuccessful Bank of North
America, which had been chartered by the Continental Congress in 1781 56) and was bolstered by
the economic theory of Adam Smith.57 It would be a federally chartered, quasi-public corporation,
with “the power to receive deposits, to provide savings accounts and manage trusts, and to issue
‘reserve notes.’” 58 It would have a monopoly over the banknotes by which federal taxes and federal
debts would be paid, even though the only power Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 gave to the federal
government to create monopolies was the power to create patents and copyrights. 59 And the Bank
would have this monopoly power in a legal culture which had long championed, and had been
steeped in, the wisdom of The Case of the Monopolies, 60 which was reported by Sir Edward Coke
and which claimed that only the sovereign King-in-Parliament, and not the King acting alone, had
the power to create monopolies. In the United States, of course, sovereignty lies with “We the
People of the United States” and not with “the President-in-Congress,” so the creation of
monopolies other than patents and copyrights would require a constitutional amendment under the
reasoning of The Case of the Monopolies (and a related statute of monopolies, which Coke wrote
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country to launch the Industrial Revolution. Whereas King Louis XIV of France (1643 to 1715) dominated
Seventeenth Century Europe, the United Kingdom, with its enormous colonial empire and the world’s most powerful
navy, dominated the Eighteenth Century. Alexander Hamilton wanted to copy the Bank of England hoping that in the
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56

See 21 J. CONTINENTAL CONG. 1187-89 (1781).

57

See Reid, supra note 52, at 118-19.

58

CALABRESI & LAWSON, supra note 1, at 603.

59
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (giving Congress power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries”) (emphasis added).
60
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as a Member of Parliament and was passed in 1623 61). The Boston Tea Party of December 16,
1773 was triggered in part by colonial objection to the British East India Company’s monopoly on
the selling of tea.
The bill to establish a national bank was debated by the First Congress in 1791. 62 It
generated fierce opposition, only some of which was based on constitutional concerns. 63 For
example, some southerners viewed the proposed bank as “a dangerous concentration of wealth and
power,” fearing that it would favor the wealthy and the north and Wall Street. 64 Was the United
States to be a nation of farmers or a mercantile industrial state? Constitutional concerns, however,
featured prominently in the debates.
The Constitution did not expressly give Congress power to create a bank or charter
corporations. The proceedings within the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention were kept secret
until 1836, but many people then living in 1791, including Congressman James Madison,
remembered very well that the Philadelphia Convention had specifically voted not to give
Congress the enumerated power to charter corporations. 65 If any such power existed, it would
have to be found in the Necessary and Proper Clause. Thus, opponents questioned whether the
establishment of a bank was “necessary and proper” for Congress to carry into execution any of
the federal government’s enumerated powers.
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See An Act Concerning Monopolies and Dispensations with Penal Laws, and the Forfeiture Thereof, 21 Jam., c. 3
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Although the most obvious argument against such a power – which would loom large three
decades later -- is that it would not be incidental but rather principal, and therefore could not stem
from an incidental powers clause, 66 a good portion of the debate focused on the meaning of the
word “necessary” in the Necessary and Proper Clause. 67 The results were less enlightening than
one might hope or expect.
Perhaps the strongest opponent of the Bank in the House of Representatives 68 was James
Madison. Only one of Madison’s comments was addressed directly to the meaning of “necessary,”
though it specifically rejected the Hamilton/Marshall account: “[T]he proposed Bank could not
even be called necessary to the Government; at most it could be but convenient.” 69 That is a clear
declaration that “necessary” means something more than “convenient.” It is not, of course, a clear
positive declaration of precisely what “necessary” means; Madison would formulate such a
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See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1950 (statement of James Madison) (warning against implication of “a great and important
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definition nearly three decades later. 70 James Jackson objected that a national bank could not be
“necessary” because some areas of the country flourished without it, 71 suggesting that “necessary”
means “indispensable.” The reports of his comments give no further elaboration. Michael Stone
contrasted necessary and proper laws with those that are merely “convenient, expedient, and
beneficial” 72 and found “no necessity . . . for this bank.” 73 William Giles said: “I have been taught
to conceive that the true exposition of a necessary mean to produce a given end was that mean
without which the end could not be produced.” 74 Thus, several Members advanced a strict
understanding of necessity, though none provided reasoning or support for their claims.
The reported comments of the Bank’s defenders in the House 75 were not significantly more
enlightening. Elbridge Gerry noted that “the popular and general meaning of the word ‘necessary’
varies according to the subjects and circumstances,” 76 but he did not provide a clear definition
relevant for the subject and circumstances at hand. Several defenders insisted that the Bank could
satisfy even the strictest standard of necessity, deeming the Bank “indispensable,” 77
“indispensably necessary” 78 and a “means, without which the end could not be obtained,” 79 and
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thus did not develop an alternative account of the term. Theodore Sedgwick argued that the
Necessary and Proper Clause “did not restrict the power of the Legislature to enacting such laws
only as are indispensable,” 80 but he did not offer a precise definition of “necessary” beyond
encompassing the “known and usual means” 81 for fulfilling ends.
The battle was again joined after Congress passed the bank bill and presented it to President
Washington. When the bill arrived on George Washington’s desk, the President decided to poll
his cabinet. Attorney General Edmund Randolph and Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, who
believed that the Necessary and Proper Clause should be read narrowly, concluded that the bank
was unconstitutional. Randolph asserted that the word “necessary” referred to “the natural means
of executing a power,” 82 but said nothing else specific about the word. Secretary of State Thomas
Jefferson, who hated monopolies and had lobbied for a ban on them in the Bill of Rights, argued
that the “constitution allows only the means which are ‘necessary’ not those which are merely
‘convenient’ for effecting the enumerated powers.” 83

“[A] little difference in the degree

of convenience” between a bank and an alternative policy, he explained, “cannot constitute the
necessity which the constitution makes the ground for assuming any non-enumerated power.” 84
Jefferson expressed concern that, if the word “necessary” were interpreted too broadly, there would
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be no enumerated power “which ingenuity may not torture into a convenience” so as to “swallow
up all the delegated powers.” 85
On the other hand, Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton, an arch-nationalist and the
bank’s leading advocate, understood the Necessary and Proper Clause quite differently.
Foreshadowing the position the McCulloch Court would ultimately adopt, Hamilton claimed that,
in both the “grammatical” and “popular sense,” the word “necessary” “often means no more
than needful, requisite, incidental, useful, or conducive to.” 86 According to Hamilton, giving the
word “necessary” “the same force as if the word absolutely or indispensibly had been prefixed to
it” would “beget endless uncertainty [and] embarrassment” since “[t]here are few measures of any
government, which would stand so severe a test.” 87 As a matter of principle, Hamilton believed
that constitutional powers “ought to be construed liberally, in advancement of the public good.” 88
In essence, Hamilton argued that Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 could be read to say that “Congress
shall have Power . . . To make all Laws which shall be convenient or useful for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”
Hamilton made a slew of other careful structural, purposive, and consequentialist
arguments for the constitutionality of the Bank of the United States, and he indeed prefigured
almost every argument in Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion. But the crux of it all came down
to whether “necessary” meant “indispensable” or “essential” as Jefferson and Randolph said or

85

Id.

86
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whether it meant “convenient” or “useful” as Hamilton said. No one put forward a clear
intermediate alternative, such as whether “necessary” really meant “needful” or “congruent or
proportional to.”
Washington was a man of few words, and he never wrote down whether he agreed with
Hamilton’s bold claims about “convenient” and “useful” or whether he simply thought he could
have averted many disasters in the Revolutionary War had there been an institution like the Bank
of the United States. George Washington was one of the largest landholders in the United States
when he died, and he never shared Jefferson’s dream that America would be a slave-owning,
aristocracy of farmers. As a real estate speculator and former general, Washington had dealt with
banks, and he knew that taxes needed to be raised and troops needed to be paid and that banks
played a role in this. This, plus Washington’s friendship with Hamilton, who he treated like his
son, may have led Washington to sign the bill creating the First Bank of the United States into law
in 1791. We are not inclined to impute to George Washington the position that “necessary and
proper” means “useful to or convenient,” especially since Washington never said as much and
there were narrower constitutional grounds upon which Washington could justify his signing of
the Bank Bill. We simply do not know Washington’s views on this particular interpretative point.

II. Necessity in the Supreme Court

A. Preliminaries

Although President Washington ultimately signed the Bank Bill, his signature did not
permanently settle either the constitutional or the policy controversy over the Bank. In 1811,
25

the bank’s charter lapsed, and Congress declined to renew it, with thirty-five of the thirty-nine
members of Congress who spoke during the debate advancing some form of constitutional
argument, mostly arguing that the Bank was unconstitutional.89 Interest in reestablishing the
bank resurfaced, however, during an economic downturn in the wake of the War of 1812. 90 In
1815, Madison, now President, accepted the bank’s constitutionality as a matter of legislative
and executive precedent, announcing that he was
[w]aiving the question of the constitutional authority of the Legislature to establish
an incorporated bank as being precluded in my judgment by repeated recognitions
under varied circumstances of the validity of such an institution in acts of the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the Government, accompanied by
indications, in different modes, of a concurrence of the general will of the nation
. . . . 91
It is not entirely clear what Madison meant by recognition of the Bank’s validity by the “judicial
branch[].” The constitutionality of the First Bank was not tested in court. Perhaps – and this is
raw speculation – he referred to United States v Fisher, 92 the Court’s first case involving the
Necessary and Proper Clause. The case had nothing to do with the Bank. It concerned a statute
giving the United States priority over the assets of debtors when they become insolvent and the
United States was among the creditors. 93 The vast majority of the argument dealt with statutory
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interpretation, but counsel arguing against application of the statute did suggest that the law was
unconstitutional: “Under what clause of the constitution is such a power given to congress? Is it
under the general power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution, the
particular powers specified? If so, where is the necessity or where the propriety of such a provision,
and to the exercise of what other power is it necessary?” 94 The government’s response was equally
brief: “Congress have duties and powers expressly given, and a right to make all laws necessary
to enable them to perform those duties, and to exercise those powers. They have a power to borrow
money, and it is their duty to provide for its payment. For this purpose they must raise a revenue,
and, to protect that revenue from frauds, a power is necessary to claim a priority of payment.” 95
The Court, through Chief Justice Marshall, sided with the government, in language that to some
extent anticipates the later decision in McCulloch:
If the act has attempted to give the United States a preference in the case
before the court, it remains to inquire whether the constitution obstructs its
operation.
....
It is claimed under the authority to make all laws which shall be necessary
and proper to carry into execution the powers vested by the constitution in the
government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.

94
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In construing this clause it would be incorrect and would produce endless
difficulties, if the opinion should be maintained that no law was authorized which
was not indispensably necessary to give effect to a specified power.
Where various systems might be adopted for that purpose, it might be said
with respect to each, that it was not necessary because the end might be obtained
by other means. Congress must possess the choice of means, and must be
empowered to use any means which are in fact conducive to the exercise of a power
granted by the constitution.
The government is to pay the debt of the union, and must be authorized to
use the means which appear to itself most eligible to effect that object. It has
consequently a right to make remittances by bills or otherwise, and to take those
precautions which will render the transaction safe. 96
If President Madison in 1815 was aware of this decision, it would explain why he thought the
“judicial department” had blessed the Bank. The Court’s opinion not only rejects the strict
Jeffersonian line regarding necessity, but equates “necessary” with “conducive to,” which was
Hamilton’s central claim in defense of the Bank. If the only relevant question was whether the
Bank was “necessary,” the Supreme Court would seem to have decided that question in 1805.
Madison nonetheless vetoed the bill on policy grounds, but then signed a bill re-chartering
a Second Bank of the United States in 1816. 97 That set the stage for what “[m]any scholars
consider . . . the single most important opinion in the Court's history.” 98
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B. Arguments

The issue finally came to a head in 1819, when a case questioning the constitutionality of
the national bank—widely believed to be a test case 99—reached the Supreme Court. The State of
Maryland had attempted to impose a tax on a local branch of the national bank. The tax applied
only to the Bank of the United States and not equally to all banks doing business in Maryland, as
those other banks had state charters. The cashier for the Baltimore Branch, James McCulloch,
refused to pay the tax, 100 giving rise to one of the most famous Supreme Court decisions in history.
In his opinion, Chief Justice John Marshall would anticipate with characteristic perceptiveness the
stakes of the case:
The constitution of our country, in its most interesting and vital parts, is to
be considered; the conflicting powers of the government of the Union and of its
members, as marked in that constitution, are to be discussed; and an opinion given,
which may essentially influence the great operations of the government. No tribunal
can approach such a question without a deep sense of its importance, and of the
awful responsibility involved in its decision. 101
Oral arguments in McCulloch v. Maryland were conducted over the course of nine days by
six of “the very best advocates of the day.” 102

Counsel for both parties presented very
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comprehensive arguments addressing the constitutionality of the bank, 103 including the existence
of implied powers, 104 states’ rights under the Tenth Amendment, 105 and reliance interests. 106 Both
sides agreed, however, that a central question was whether the bank was “necessary” to the
execution of enumerated powers within the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause. 107 It
was suggested that the bank was “necessary and proper” for carrying out
the powers of levying and collecting taxes throughout this widely-extended empire;
of paying the public debts, both in the United States and in foreign countries; of
borrowing money, at home and abroad; of regulating commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several states; of raising and supporting armies and a navy;
and of carrying on war. 108
Arguing for McCulloch, Daniel Webster asserted that necessary powers are those that “are suitable
and fitted to the object” and “best and most useful in relation to the end proposed.” 109 Likewise,
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Attorney General, William Wirt argued that “necessary” means “are those which are useful and
appropriate to produce the particular end.” 110 The words “[n]ecessary and proper,” he suggested,
are “equivalent to needful and adapted.” 111 Finally, William Pinkney, who also represented
McCulloch, raised a distinct textual argument. “The word necessary, standing by itself, has no
inflexible meaning,” he claimed, “it may be qualified by the addition of adverbs of diminution or
enlargement, such as very, indispensably, more, less, or absolutely necessary.” 112 Thus, advocates
for the bank produced a wide array of possible synonyms for the word “necessary.”
An attorney for Maryland presented a competing set of synonyms in line with Jefferson’s
strict understanding of necessity. “The word ‘necessary,’ is said to be a synonyme of ‘needful,’”
he claimed, “[b]ut both these words are defined ‘indispensably requisite;’ and, most certainly, this
is the sense in which the word ‘necessary’ is used in the constitution.” 113
Both parties recognized that the stakes of settling the meaning of the word “necessary”
were high. On behalf of McCulloch, Webster argued that “if congress could use no means but
such as were absolutely indispensable to the existence of a granted power, the government would
hardly exist.” 114 Likewise, the Attorney General claimed that a “strict and literal” interpretation
of the clause would “render every law which could be passed by congress unconstitutional” 115 and
“annihilate the very powers it professes to create.” 116 On the other hand, a lawyer for Maryland
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argued that “[t]o give [the clause] a more lax sense, would be to alter the whole character of the
government as a sovereignty of limited powers.” 117 After all, as the State’s attorney general
pointed out, the proponents of the Constitution at the time of ratification denied allegations “that
it contained a vast variety of powers, lurking under the generality of its phraseology.” 118 Had such
powers been “fairly avowed at the time” the Constitution might never have been ratified. 119
At least two things were conspicuously absent from these arguments. One was whether
United States v. Fisher had already definitively resolved the question what the Constitution means
by “necessary.” This omission is an interesting window into the early post-founding view of
judicial precedent. Another absence was any reference to an intermediate standard for necessity
between the Scylla of Hamiltonian laxness and the Charybdis of Jeffersonian strictness. The
parties presented the Court with a very stark choice.

C. Decision

The Supreme Court ruled for McCulloch in a unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice
John Marshall. This article does not attempt a comprehensive look at the opinion and the many
methodological, interpretative, and substantive issues that it raises. We focus narrowly on the
decision’s treatment of the requirement that laws executing federal powers be “necessary.” 120
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That treatment is lengthy, but it can be reduced to seven key propositions. First and
foremost, Marshall rejected the strict Jeffersonian definition of necessity in favor of Hamilton’s
lax definition, for precisely the linguistic reason given by Hamilton in 1791:
Does [the word “necessary] . . . always import an absolute physical necessity, so
strong, that one thing, to which another may be termed necessary, cannot exist
without that other? We think it does not. If reference be had to its use, in the
common affairs of the world, or in approved authors, we find that it frequently
imports no more than that one thing is convenient, or useful, or essential to another.
To employ the means necessary to an end, is generally understood as employing
any means calculated to produce the end . . . . 121
Interestingly, Marshall made no reference to his similar treatment of “necessary” fourteen years
earlier in Fisher.
Second, Marshall claimed that “necessary” “admits of all degrees of comparison; and is
often connected with other words, which increase or diminish the impression the mind receives of
the urgency it imports. A thing may be necessary, very necessary, absolutely or indispensably
necessary.” 122 Because the Imposts Clause allows a State to impose export duties without
congressional consent when “absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws,” 123 the bare
word “necessary” in the Necessary and Proper Clause must have a looser meaning than it has in
the Imposts Clause.
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17 U.S. (4 Wheat) at 413-14.
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Id. at 414.
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U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
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Third, giving “necessary” a strict reading would have bad consequences by trammeling on
the judgment of Congress:
The subject is the execution of those great powers on which the welfare of a nation
essentially depends. It must have been the intention of those who gave these
powers, to insure, so far as human prudence could insure, their beneficial execution.
This could not be done, by confiding the choice of means to such narrow limits as
not to leave it in the power of congress to adopt any which might be appropriate,
and which were conducive to the end . . . . To have declared, that the best means
shall not be used, but those alone, without which the power given would be
nugatory, would have been to deprive the legislature of the capacity to avail itself
of experience, to exercise its reason, and to accommodate its legislation to
circumstances. 124
Fourth, Marshall noted that the only powers expressly given to Congress to punish
lawbreaking concerned counterfeiting and piracy. 125 The power to punish anything else had to
stem from the Necessary and Proper Clause, but the strict Jeffersonian understanding of
“necessary” would not permit an inference to such power:
Take, for example, the power “to establish post-offices and post-roads.”
This power is executed, by the single act of making the establishment. But, from
this has been inferred the power and duty of carrying the mail along the post-road,
from one post-office to another. And from this implied power, has again been
inferred the right to punish those who steal letters from the post-office, or rob the
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17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 415.
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See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 6 & 10.
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mail. It may be said, with some plausibility, that the right to carry the mail, and to
punish those who rob it, is not indispensably necessary to the establishment of a
post-office and post-road. This right is indeed essential to the beneficial exercise of
the power, but not indispensably necessary to its existence. So, of the punishment
of the crimes of stealing or falsifying a record or process of a court of the United
States, or of perjury in such court. To punish these offences, is certainly conducive
to the due administration of justice. But courts may exist, and may decide the causes
brought before them, though such crimes escape punishment.
. . . . The . . . power of punishment . . . is a means for carrying into execution
all sovereign powers, and may be used, although not indispensably necessary. It is
a right incidental to the power, and conducive to its beneficial exercise. 126
Fifth, Marshall insisted that conjoining “necessary” with “proper” ruled out the strict
Jeffersonian construction, because it would render the word “proper” pointless:
If the word “necessary” was used in that strict and rigorous sense for which the
counsel for the state of Maryland contend, it would be an extraordinary departure
from the usual course of the human mind, as exhibited in composition, to add a
word [viz., “proper”}, the only possible effect of which is, to qualify that strict and
rigorous meaning; to present to the mind the idea of some choice of means of
legislation, not strained and compressed within the narrow limits for which
gentlemen contend. 127
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Sixth, and for Marshall “most conclusively,” 128 if the Constitution did not contain the
Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress would have a Hamiltonian free hand in executing federal
powers, so it must have an equally free hand given the Necessary and Proper Clause as a whole:
To waste time and argument in proving that, without . . . [the Necessary and Proper
Clause], congress might carry its powers into execution, would be not much less
idle, than to hold a lighted taper to the sun. As little can it be required to prove, that
in the absence of this clause, congress would have some choice of means. That it
might employ those which, in its judgment, would most advantageously effect the
object to be accomplished. That any means adapted to the end, any means which
tended directly to the execution of the constitutional powers of the government,
were in themselves constitutional. This clause, as construed by the state of
Maryland, would abridge, and almost annihilate, this useful and necessary right of
the legislature to select its means. That this could not be intended, is, we should
think, had it not been already controverted, too apparent for controversy.
We think so for the following reasons:
1st. The clause is placed among the powers of congress, not among the
limitations on those powers.
2d. Its terms purport to enlarge, not to diminish the powers vested in the
government. It purports to be an additional power, not a restriction on those already
granted . . . .
The result of the most careful and attentive consideration bestowed upon
this clause is, that if it does not enlarge, it cannot be construed to restrain the powers
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Id. at 419.
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of congress, or to impair the right of the legislature to exercise its best judgment in
the selection of measures to carry into execution the constitutional powers of the
government. If no other motive for its insertion can be suggested, a sufficient one
is found in the desire to remove all doubts respecting the right to legislate on that
vast mass of incidental powers which must be involved in the constitution, if that
instrument be not a splendid bauble.
A seventh ultimate proposition summarizes the first six. Through Marshall’s legerdemain,
the word “necessary” is not construed to mean “needful and proper” or “congruent and
proportional” but is watered down instead to the following weak test: “Let the end be legitimate,
let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional.” 129
Taken together, Marshall’s propositions are likely good enough to decide the case before
him. Keep mind that to rule for the Bank, the Court did not need to find that Hamilton’s
interpretation of “necessary” was correct. It needed only to find that the State of Maryland’s
interpretation was wrong and that the Bank would satisfy the constitutional requirement of
necessity so long as the State was wrong. That is essentially what the Court said after its discussion
of “necessary:’
That it [the corporate Bank] is a convenient, a useful, and essential
instrument in the prosecution of its fiscal operations, is not now a subject of
controversy. All those who have been concerned in the administration of our
finances, have concurred in representing its importance and necessity; and so

129

Id. at 419-21.

37

strongly have they been felt, that statesmen of the first class, whose previous
opinions against it had been confirmed by every circumstance which can fix the
human judgment, have yielded those opinions to the exigencies of the nation. Under
the confederation, congress, justifying the measure by its necessity, transcended,
perhaps, its powers, to obtain the advantage of a bank; and our own legislation
attests the universal conviction of the utility of this measure. The time has passed
away, when it can be necessary to enter into any discussion, in order to prove the
importance of this instrument, as a means to effect the legitimate objects of the
government.
But were its necessity less apparent, none can deny its being an appropriate
measure; and if it is, the degree of its necessity, as has been very justly observed, is
to be discussed in another place. Should congress, in the execution of its powers,
adopt measures which are prohibited by the constitution; or should congress, under
the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not
intrusted to the government; it would become the painful duty of this tribunal,
should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to say, that such an act was
not the law of the land. But where the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated
to effect any of the objects intrusted to the government, to undertake here to inquire
into the degree of its necessity, would be to pass the line which circumscribes the
judicial department, and to tread on legislative ground. This court disclaims all
pretensions to such a power. 130
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Id.at 422-23.
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This passage can mean either or both of two things. First, it might mean that the Bank satisfies
any plausible standard of “necessary” less strict than literal indispensability. There is some support
for this view of the opinion, in that Marshall typically conjoins Hamiltonian language of
convenience or usefulness with other language that is stricter. For example, when discussing the
inference of a congressional power to enact criminal laws beyond the narrow fields of
counterfeiting and piracy, Marshall asks: “If the word ‘necessary’ means ‘needful,’ ‘requisite,’
‘essential,’ ‘conducive to,’ in order to let in the power of punishment for the infraction of law; why
is it not equally comprehensive, when required to authorize the use of means which facilitate the
execution of the powers of government, without the infliction of punishment?” Here “conducive
to” is accompanied by “essential, “requisite,” and “needful.” (We will explore the term “needful”
in the next section, but we note for now that its eighteenth-century meaning was very close to
“essential.”.). Those words are odd company for a Hamiltonian account of necessity Second, the
passage might mean that the decision whether the Bank satisfies any standard less strict than literal
indispensability is a political question that the courts will not and cannot decide. Either or both of
those propositions might be wrong, but under either of them, it is not necessary (or proper?) for
the Court to endorse the Hamiltonian account of necessity. Any language suggesting such an
endorsement is dictum – as it was in United States v. Fisher.

D. Critique

Indeed, to the extent that the Court sought to make the case for a Hamiltonian view, its
arguments were notoriously weak.—and, indeed, generally ill-suited to the task.

Consider

Marshall’s first six propositions – the six that lead to his ultimate conclusion -- in reverse order.
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Chief Justice Marshall was obviously correct that, in the absence of the Necessary and
Proper Clause, Congress would still have the ability to effectuate federal powers. That proposition
flows easily from basic agency law: Grants of principal powers presumptively carry incidental
powers in their wake. It requires an express provision, as was included in the Articles of
Confederation, 131 to negate that ordinary presumption.

That is why the Federalists in the

ratification debates could, with credibility, say that the Necessary and Proper Clause confirmed
and clarified rather than granted the existence of incidental powers in the national government.
But that is far removed from saying that those baseline agency-law incidental powers would allow
Congress to “employ those [means] which, in its judgment, would most advantageously effect the
object to be accomplished . . . [and] which tended directly to the execution of the constitutional
powers of the government.” It would certainly be possible to draft an agency instrument which
gave the agent such a broad scope of incidental powers. In the absence of a specific clause,
however, the agent would have only those incidental powers that would normally accompany the
principal powers. The Court offered no reason to think that its capacious account of incidental
powers was the default rule for the Constitution. Moreover, as Robert Natelson has exhaustively
documented, the phrase “necessary and proper” was among the most restrictive formulae available
to eighteenth-century drafters to describe and circumscribe the incidental powers of agents.132
Marshall’s assumption that the Necessary and Proper Clause could only expand, and not constrict,
the common-law baseline of incidental powers was a bald and transparently unwarranted assertion.
As a trained lawyer well versed in agency law, Marshall surely knew this.
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See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II (“Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every
power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress
assembled.”) (emphasis added).
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See Natelson, supra note 23, at 80.
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Marshall’s fifth argument, which focuses on the conjunction of “necessary” with “proper,”
sought to establish only that the State of Maryland’s strict account of necessity was wrong, not that
the lax Hamiltonian alternative account of necessity was right. Even on those limited terms, it is
again a transparently weak argument. It assumes that “necessary” and “proper” do the same work.
That was indeed the argument of Daniel Webster, 133 but it is clearly wrong as a matter of both
usage 134 and principle. Necessity describes a causal relationship between means and ends.
Propriety could also describe such a relationship but, in the context of agency instruments, has a
broader meaning which connotes the obligation to conform to fiduciary norms. 135 “Necessary”
and “proper” simply describe different things. They complement rather than limit each other.
Marshall’s argument also fails if, as Samuel Bray has suggested in an intriguing article, the
terms “necessary and proper” function as a hendiadys: “two terms, not fully synonymous, that
together work as a single unit of meaning.” 136 In other words, instead of reading each word
sequentially, perhaps one should read “necessary and proper” as a unitary phrase with a single
meaning. If that is the correct understanding of “necessary and proper,” an argument such as
Marshall’s that attaches independent significance to each term is misguided. 137

133
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An assessment of Professor Bray’s argument is beyond the scope of this article. But because the argument, if
correct, calls into question the lifetime project of one of us to ascertain the original meaning of “proper,” see Lawson
& Seidman, supra note 36, Lawson, supra note 9; Lawson & Granger, supra note 23, and because a number of modern
Supreme Court decisions have attached distinct significance to the word “proper,” see National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 559 (2012); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-24 (1997); a
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and the Language of the Law, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1321 (2018), Just as one would be more likely to look for
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The fourth argument, suggesting that a strict understanding of necessity would forbid
Congress from passing enforcement laws for anything except counterfeiting and piracy, 138 is again
addressed solely to the most extreme version of the State of Maryland’s argument. It has no bite
against a more calibrated version of the Jeffersonian account of necessity – and certainly has no
bite against anything in between Hamilton and Jefferson.
The third and fourth arguments are quite similar. Yes, it would be odd if there was one
and only one set of means in any given circumstance constitutionally available to Congress. That
is a good argument against an interpretation of necessity – in an incidental powers clause -- that is
tantamount to a prohibition on incidental powers. Again, that has no traction against any but the
most extreme versions of strict necessity. And it is a monumental leap from that sound proposition
to the further claim that Congress therefore must be able to use any means that are “conducive” to
its chosen ends. There is a lot of space between “conducive” and “indispensable.”

metaphors in a poem than in a power of attorney (and probably more likely to look for technical words of art in the
latter than in the former), perhaps it makes more sense to look for a hendiadys in a play or lunchtime conversation
than in a formal legal document. Second, intratextually, the terms “necessary” and “proper” show up in other
constitutional clauses, sometimes singly and sometimes in combination with other terms (e.g., “absolutely necessary”),
which seems to cut in favor of assigning meaning to each. Third, and finally, even if Professor Bray is ultimately
right, the hendiadys label only has bite if the unitary meaning of “necessary and proper” refers only to causal meansends connection. That is surely not right. Once one identifies the Necessary and Proper Clause as an incidental powers
clause, then the central question becomes which interpretative principles flow from that identification. If there was
an established set of background rules for interpreting incidental powers clauses in agency instruments in the
eighteenth century (and there was), and if the phrase “necessary and proper” was a commonly-used phrase in agency
law at that time (and it was), and if all of the above would have been well known to the four agency lawyers and the
agency-employing businessman on the Committee of Detail that drafted the clause (and it would have been), then it
probably does not matter whether one parses "necessary" and "proper" in sequence to yield those interpretative
principles or if one simply takes the phrase as a hendiadys that represents those principles. The principles are the
principles. And if those principles went beyond a straightforward means-ends relationship and instead incorporate
agency-law ideas such as a fiduciary duty of care, a duty of loyalty and a requirement not to exceed the scope of the
granted agency (and they did), then little of consequence turns on whether one classifies the clause as a hendiadys or
treats “necessary” and “proper” as distinct component parts of a set of fiduciary principles. In other words, perhaps
we are dealing not so much with a hendiadys, in the literary sense of that term, as with a legal term of art.
138
For a modern version of Marshall’s argument, see Andrew M. Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers: The
Obvious Constitutionality of Health Care Reform, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1 (2011). For what one of us thinks is a
devastating rebuttal, see David B. Kopel & Gary Lawson, Bad News for Professor Koppelman: The Incidental
Unconstitutionality of the Individual Mandate, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 267 (2011).
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The comparison of “necessary” and “absolutely necessary” is yet again a persuasive
argument against an interpretation of “necessary” as literally “indispensable.”

The Court

successfully shows that “necessary” in the context of the Necessary and Proper Clause cannot
plausibly take the strongest possible meaning of which the word is linguistically capable.
If that is all that McCulloch sought to do, this article probably would not exist. And there
is a very good case that that is all that McCulloch should have sought to do. If litigation is properly
viewed as a form of dispute resolution, then perhaps all courts should do is to pass on the relative
weights of the arguments put forward by the parties – even if both parties are in some important
respects getting the law “wrong.” The idea that courts should reach out and get the law (or the
facts) “right” reflects a different model of litigation, in which courts are primarily declarers of law,
and the disputes between parties are simply the vehicles through which courts perform that lawdeclaration function. On a dispute resolution model, it was enough for McCulloch to decide that
the State of Maryland had not made its case, leaving in place the pre-decision status quo (which
included a federal statute that was enacted in accordance with Article I, section 7 procedures and
was therefore a “law”) 139.
But that is not all that McCulloch said. Marshall’s first argument was a rehash of
Hamilton’s sweeping claim about linguistic usage, which purports not only to reject the State of
Maryland’s view of necessity but also affirmatively to endorse the idea that a necessary law need
only be “convenient,” “useful,” or “calculated to produce the end.” If posterity had treated the

139
These two models of litigation are mostly closely associated with Lon Fuller (dispute resolution) and Owen Fiss
(law declaration). The models are oversimplifications of the thought of two of the past century’s subtlest legal minds,
but they are nonetheless valuable as ideal types. For a more detailed analysis of the models and their implications for
judging, see GARY LAWSON, EVIDENCE OF THE LAW: PROVING LEGAL CLAIMS 175-92 (2017).
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linguistic claim as throwaway dicta, we would roll our eyes and move on. Posterity, however, has
had very different ideas.

E. Reception

Virtually every aspect of McCulloch was controversial when it was issued. The dictum
regarding “necessary” was no exception. For example, in 1819 “Amphictyon” 140 objected to the
Court’s seeming adoption of the Hamiltonian view of necessity because it would authorize
Congress to abolish state property taxes. After all, if Congress imposed a tax of its own, “[i]t
would be extremely convenient and a very appropriate measure, and very conducive to their
purpose of collecting this tax speedily and promptly, if the state governments could be prohibited
during the same year from laying and collecting a land tax.” 141 Spencer Roane bitterly criticized
the opinion in a series of articles written as “Hampden.” 142 In a private letter, James Madison
attacked McCulloch’s dictum that “the expediency [and] constitutionality of means for carrying
into effect a specified power, are convertible terms,” asserting that the Constitution might not have
been ratified if it had been anticipated that such a “broad” and “pliant” “rule of construction would
be introduced.”
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Chief Justice Marshall took the unusual step of responding to the criticism,

particularly the newspaper essays, under the pen names “A Friend to the Union “ and “A Friend
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of the Constitution.” 144 He denied that the decision would result in “an enlargement of the powers
of congress” and claimed that the Court had simply sought to “remind us that a constitution cannot
possibly enumerate the means by which the powers of government are to be carried into
execution.” 145
Despite the controversy it generated, the case had little immediate impact on American law
for the next several decades. For the most part, Congress and future presidents did not “act[] upon
the Court’s generous definition of national power” until well after the Civil War. 146 Federal
lawmaking took off with the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and the Sherman Act’snantitrust
law of 1890 and gathered speed from 1901 when Theodore Roosevelt became President.
McCulloch v. Maryland did generate one famous and very influential critic: President
Andrew Jackson who vetoed the renewal of the Bank of the United States in July 1832. 147
Jackson’s veto was based on a wide range of both constitutional and political considerations, many
of which targeted the monopoly features of the Bank; we focus her only on those parts that address
the meaning of “necessary.” 148

144

See Gunther, supra note 143, at 449-50.

145

John Marshall, Essays from the “Alexandria Gazette,” 21 STAN. L. REV. 456, 475, 477 (1969).

146

Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were the “Great” Marshall Court Decisions?, 87 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1130-31
(2001).

147
Veto Message of July 10, 1832, in 3 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1139,
1144-45 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897). Consequently, for eighty-two years, until creation of the Federal Reserve
Board in 1914, the United States had no central bank. During those eighty-two years with no Bank of the United
States,“[t]hroughout this vast republic from the St. Croix to the Gulph of Mexico, from the Atlantic to the Pacific,
revenue . . . [was] collected and expended, armies [were] . . . marched and supported. The . . . treasure raised in the
north [was] . . . transported to the south, that raised in the east [was] conveyed to the west . . . .” Not only that, but
the United States grew from twenty-two to forty-eight States, the economy and population exploded, and the United
States became one of the world’s major financial powers. This perhaps suggests that Supreme Court justices should
be humble about their consequentialist predictions.
148

For a broader look at the constitutional significance of Jackson’s veto message, see CALABRESI & LAWSON, supra
note 21, at 628-34.

45

Jackson did not object in principle to the concept of a national bank, which he thought “in
many respects convenient for the Government and useful to the people.” 149 He objected, rather,
that some of the specific “powers and privileges conferred on it can not be supposed necessary for
the purpose for which it is proposed to be created, and are not, therefore, means necessary to attain
the end in view, and consequently not justified by the Constitution.” 150 Specifically, the 1832 bill
proposed a fifteen-year monopoly, which in Jackson’s view unduly limited Congress’s own
discretion under the Necessary and Proper Clause:
If Congress possessed the power to establish one bank, they had power to
establish more than one if in their opinion two or more banks had been "necessary"
to facilitate the execution of the powers delegated to them in the Constitution . . . .
But the Congress of 1816 have taken it away from their successors for twenty years,
and the Congress of 1832 proposes to abolish it for fifteen years more. It can not
be "necessary" or "proper" for Congress to barter away or divest themselves of any
of the powers-vested in them by the Constitution to be exercised for the public
good. It is not "necessary" to the efficiency of the bank, nor is it "proper'' in relation
to themselves and their successors. 151
This argument does not challenge McCulloch’s account of means-ends relationships. Indeed, it
emphasizes the vast discretion of Congress and objects that the monopoly features of the bank bill
unduly trammel that discretion. More than anything, it is an argument that the bill’s monopoly
feature is not “proper.” The same is true of Jackson’s subsequent argument that Congress could
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not delegate to the bank the constitutional power to “coin Money [and] regulate the Value
thereof” 152: “It is neither necessary nor proper to transfer its legislative power to such a bank, and
therefore unconstitutional.” 153 Again, this does not challenge McCulloch’s account of means-ends
connections but simply reads the Necessary and Proper Clause to embody the basic agency-law
principle against subdelegation of authority. 154
In sum, while Jackson denied that McCulloch settled the constitutionality of the 1832 bank
bill, 155 nothing in his message directly addressed what constitutes a “necessary” causal connection
between means and ends. If Jackson objected to a Hamiltonian account of necessity, he did not
make that clear in his veto message.
The Civil War marked a sea change in the role of the federal government. The Civil War
Amendments and Reconstruction obviously expanded the federal role far beyond anything
contemplated in 1788. And that was only the beginning. The post-Civil War period saw the rise
of Progressivism, with its expanded conception of the appropriate role for national government in
regulating economic life. The New Deal in the 1930s carried the Progressive vision to the next
level, and the Great Society in the 1960s continued the expansion of federal activity. While that
expansion was driven by a mix of legal, political, and ideological factors far too complex for us to
process, much less to address in a law review article, one piece of the engine driving that process
was Marshall’s dictum in McCulloch.
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While it is conventional today to ascribe the constitutional validation of the modern federal
government to an expansive reading of the Commerce Clause, that is only part of the story.
Certainly if “Commerce among the several States” was not understood to encompass such
activities as agriculture, contracting, insurance, manufacturing, and mining, the scope of federal
power would be much smaller. But many of the seminal cases upholding an expanded federal role
relied, at least in part, on the Necessary and Proper Clause, and at least some of those decisions
implicated Marshall’s dictum. In Part VI, we survey some of those cases to see how, if at all, they
would change if one substituted a Madisonian “congruence and proportionality” test for
Hamilton’s “convenience or conduciveness” test. For now, we simply highlight some of the legal
effects of Marshall’s dictum.
Interestingly, the first use of the dictum in a Supreme Court opinion came in a dissent. In
Hepburn v. Griswold, 156 the Court held that Congress could not make Civil War greenbacks, with
delayed redemption in precious metals, legal tender. Justice Miller’s dissenting opinion relied
heavily on a Hamiltonian interpretation of McCulloch. 157 The dissent, of course, became a
majority the next term through the magic of court-packing; the decision in Hepburn was overruled
in Knox v. Lee, 158 which expressly relied on the Hamilton construction of McCulloch. 159 That
construction was on its way to being settled law.
In the 1930s and 1940s, the Court decided a series of cases that have shaped constitutional
law for the ensuing ninety years. The most notable cases were NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
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Corp. 160, United States v. Darby, 161 and Wickard v. Filburn. 162 While they are still sometimes
viewed as interpretations of the federal commerce power, it is now increasingly understood that
those cases – all of which involve regulation of matters that affect commerce among the several
States even if those matters are not themselves commerce among the several States – really involve,
sub silentio, the Necessary and Proper Clause, 163 following the seminal analysis from 1914’s
Shreveport Rate Cases, 164 which allowed Congress to regulate intrastate rail rates as an incident
to its power to regulate interstate rates. As an original matter, Congress’s power to leverage control
of interstate commerce into control of intrastate or non-commerce activities may depend on
something beyond the scope of this article: The extent to which such regulation is truly incidental
or is instead, in Marshall’s terms, “a great substantive and independent power, which cannot be
implied as incidental to other powers.” 165 This article tracks only the development of Marshall’s
account of the causal connection required for laws to be “necessary.”
Tracking that development is more difficult than one might suppose, because for much of
the last century, the Court has primarily described its holdings regarding congressional power in
terms of the Commerce Clause, even when the Necessary and Proper Clause was actually doing
the work in the background. Thus, there are surprisingly few express references to Marshall’s
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definition of “necessary.” Nonetheless, it is clear from a century of cases that the Court implicitly
accepted an extreme version of Marshall’s formulation. It would take a book to examine all of the
cases that led to this development. The key fact is that the Supreme Court has never found a
congressional statute unconstitutional on the specific ground that it lacked a causal connection to
an identifiable federal power.
Indeed, in recent decades, the Court has translated the Hamilton/Marshall definition of
“necessary” into language that fits the post-New Deal model of tiers of scrutiny: Executory laws
are necessary, says the modern Court, if the legislative judgment of necessity has a rational basis.
One can perhaps trace this evolution in doctrinal language to Katzenbach v. McClung, 166
the famous case in which the Court upheld application of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
forbidding discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin in all public
accommodations, 167 to Ollie’s Barbeque because some of the restaurant’s supplies traveled in
interstate commerce. 168 The case was an easy application of prior decisions such as Darby, which
upheld Congress’s power to control intrastate wage contracts, and Wickard, which evaluated
effects on commerce based on classes of activities rather than specific activities. In applying those
straightforward precedents, however, the Court said: “W]here we find that the legislators, in light
of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory
scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our investigation is at an end.” 169 By that point
in time, the Court had elaborated the ”rational basis” inquiry to mean that “inquiries, where the
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legislative judgment is drawn into question, must be restricted to the issue whether any state of
facts either known or which could reasonably be assumed affords support for it.” 170 In other words,
legislation has a rational basis if there is any conceivable or imaginable factual basis for it, whether
or not those facts actually exist and whether or not the legislature actually relied on those supposed
facts. 171 As applied to the Necessary and Proper Clause, this comes very close to declaring the
necessity of laws a political question or defining “necessary” to mean “rational” – an even more
expansive understanding than is captured by “convenient” or “useful.”
For sixty years, the combination of an expansive conception of commerce, the rational
basis test for necessity, and the disappearance from doctrine both of the word “proper” and of the
distinction between incidental and principal powers meant that Congress had essentially unlimited
legislative jurisdiction. From 1937 to 1995, the only laws found by the Court to exceed Congress’s
enumerated powers were two laws that directly regulated state governments and thus threatened
what the Court regarded as a constitutional principle of state sovereignty. 172 One of those cases
was overruled within a decade of its issuance, 173 and the other claimed that its holding came from
the Tenth Amendment. 174
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In 1995, the Court reopened the door to claims of limited congressional power in United
States v. Lopez, 175 which held that Congress could not criminalize possession of a firearm within
1000 feet of a school. The case was decided under the Commerce Clause; the majority opinion
did not mention the Necessary and Proper Clause. The Court thus treated the power to regulate
interstate commerce as itself including the power to regulate intrastate matters that substantially
affect interstate commerce, 176 which obviated any need for the Court to address the meaning of
“necessary.” The four dissenting Justices similarly couched their discussions entirely in terms of
the commerce power.

Justice Souter and Justice Breyer both strongly emphasized that

congressional judgments about effects on commerce should be judged on a rational basis standard.
Justice Souter claimed: “In reviewing congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause, we
defer to what is often a merely implicit congressional judgment that its regulation addresses a
subject substantially affecting interstate commerce ‘if there is any rational basis for such a
finding.’ “ 177 Justice Breyer similarly observed: “[W]e must ask whether Congress could have
had a rational basis for finding a significant (or substantial) connection between gun-related
school violence and interstate commerce.” 178 These comments could easily be adapted to the real
underlying issue: Whether regulating possession of guns near schools – an activity which by itself
is obviously not “Commerce . . . among the several States” – is necessary and proper for carrying
into execution some other power within Congress’s jurisdiction.
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That connection between the rational basis test and the Necessary and Proper Clause
became explicit in 2004 in Sabri v. United States 179 – a relatively neglected but important
decision. 180 According to prosecutors, Sabri tried to bribe some Minneapolis housing officials to
get licenses and zoning decisions for his property development. Those prosecutors, however, were
not Minnesota state prosecutors. They were lawyers in the U.S. Attorney’s office, who charged
Sabri with violating a federal statute prohibiting bribery of state officials if the state agency – not
the briber, but the bribed agency – receives more than $10,000 in federal funds. 181 There is no
requirement under the statute that the alleged bribery involve federal funds; it is enough if the state
agency receives any. Sabri challenged the law’s constitutionality. He won in the district court182
but lost in the Eighth Circuit, where the court found the statute constitutional as a necessary and
proper means for executing the federal spending power. 183 The court of appeals three times used
the phrase “rationally related” to describe the inquiry under the Necessary and Proper Clause. 184
The Supreme Court also upheld the statute on the same rationale. The Court expressly cited
McCulloch as “establishing review for means-ends rationality under the Necessary and Proper
Clause,” 185 and it had no trouble finding a rational basis in Congress’s desire to protect the integrity
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of federally funded programs. And with that, the standard for necessity under the Necessary and
Proper Clause officially became “rational basis.” 186
Thus, Marshall’s 1819 dictum has made the necessity of legislation under the Necessary
and Proper Clause all but non-justiciable. Formally, one can bring a challenge based on meansends connections, and the Court will not dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. But one will inevitably
lose, given the laxity of the rational basis test. And Marshall’s dictum, in turn, ultimately relies
on Hamilton’s 1791 claim about linguistic usage. There is nothing else in McCulloch that
affirmatively supports the idea that “necessary” means “convenient.” Accordingly, it is of more
than academic interest whether Hamilton and Marshall were right. In the next three sections, we
explore that question using dictionaries, corpus linguistics, and intertextual and intratextual
analysis.

III. Dictionary Definitions of “Necessary” and Its Cognates
Because Hamilton and Marshall grounded their claims in ordinary usage, a good place to
start – not necessarily to finish, but to start – to test their claims is with dictionaries. Gregory
Maggs has identified eight general purpose dictionaries that were available in the founding era,
plus Noah Webster’s dictionary that first appeared in 1828, four decades after the founding. 187
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The most influential work was Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language, 188 so that
is where we begin.
The first edition of the Dictionary was published in 1755. A sixth edition issued in 1785,
right on the eve of the Constitution’s ratification. There is no difference in the definitions that we
examine between those editions, but the later version includes several additional literary sources
as references. Here is the definition of “necessary” from the 1785 edition:
1. Needful; Indispensably requisite.
Being it is impossible we should have the same sanctity which is in God, it will be necessary
to declare what is this holiness which maketh men be accounted holy ones, and called saints. Pearson.
All greatness is in virtue understood;
‘Tis only necessary to be good. Dryden’s Aurengzebe
A certain kind of temper is necessary to the pleasure and quiet of our minds, consequently
to our happiness; and that is holiness and goodness. Tillotson
The Dutch would go on to challenge the military government and the revenues, and reckon
them among what shall be thought necessary for their barrier. Swift

2.

Not free; fatal; impelled by fate.
Death, a necessary end,
Will come when it will come. Shakespeare

3.

Conclusive; decisive by inevitable consequence.
They resolve us not, what they understand by the commandment of the word; whether a
literal and formal commandment, or a commandment inferred by an necessary inference. White.
No man can shew by any necessary argument, that it is naturally impossible that all the
relations concerning America should be false. Tillotson’s Pref. 189

188
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The quotations from literature, which Johnson uses in defining “necessary” and which appear
above, will make the reader immediately realize that “necessary” is indeed a synonym for: 1)
needful; 2) indispensable; 3) impelled by fate; or 4) conclusive and by inevitable consequence.
For example, Shakespeare defines death as “necessary,” but it is certainly not “convenient” or
useful!”
We saw above that Chief Justice John Marshall mistakenly claimed that the word “proper”
watered down the word “necessary,” making it mean “convenient” or “useful.” We also saw that
Gary Lawson and Patricia Granger had disputed that construction, arguing that “proper” is a
different noun to overcome than is “necessary” 190 Lawson and Granger turn out to be exactly
right. Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language of 1755 (with no difference in the
later edition) offers the following relevant definitions of the word “proper”: “1) Peculiar; not
belong to more; not common . . . , 3) One’s own. It is joined with any of the possessives; as my
proper, their proper . . . ;5) Fit; accommodated; adapted; suitable; qualified , , , ..” 191 Rather than
describing a causal relationship, “proper” describes a purposive connection, which is why Lawson
and Granger call it a ”jurisdictional” 192 term. An action is “proper” if it is peculiarly appropriate
to the actor. The original meaning of “proper” is not “convenient” or “useful.” Something can be
convenient or useful but not be one’s own or distinctively appropriate to one’s exercise.
A third word, which is given as a meaning of “necessary’ and on which we believe we
should consult Samuel Johnson is: “needful.” This is the most potentially expansive definition of
“necessary”

that

Johnson

gives.

The

others

–

“indispensably

190

See Lawson & Granger, supra note 23, at 291-97. See also Lawson, supra note 9, at 249-55.

191

2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1755).

192

Lawson & Granger, supra note 23, at 273.

56

requisite,”

“impelled by fate,” “conclusive,” – obviously give no support to Hamilton and Marshall.
Unfortunately for them, Johnson, says the word “needful” means: “need and full; Necessary;
Indispensably requisite.” 193

If anything, the definition of “needful” supports Jefferson and

Maryland! Johnson’s literary references hammer the point home even harder. The book of
Common Prayer says “Give us all things that be needful, both for our souls and our bodies.”
Needful certainly does not mean “convenient” or “useful” here. Shakespeare says that “Do you
consent we shall acquaint him with it, As needful in our loves, fitting our duty.” Needful does not
mean “convenient” or “useful” here. “All things needful for defense abound. [two guardsmen]
walk the round. Dryden.” Again, “needful” means more than “convenient” or “useful.” “To my
present purpose it is not needful to use arguments, to evince the world to be infinite. Locke.”
“Needful” does not mean convenient” or “useful” here. And, finally, “A lonely desert, and an
empty land, Shall scarce afford for needful hours of rest. Addison.” Again, “needful” does not
mean “convenient” or “useful” here.
A fourth word that is the noun at the root of “needful” is “need,” and Johnson defines the
noun ”need” as follows: “1) Exigency; pressing difficulty; necessity; 2) Want: distressful poverty;
3) Want; lack of anything for use.” 194 None of these definitions implies “convenient” or “useful,”
but they do imply something almost like “indispensable.”
A fifth word that Samuel Johnson gives as one of the definitions of “necessary” is the word
“essential”. Here is how Johnson defines “essential”: “1) Necessary to the Constitution or
existence of any thing; 2) Importance in the highest degree; principal; and 3) Pure; highly rectified;
subtilty elaborated; extracted so as to contain all the virtues of its elemental parts contracted into
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a narrow compass.” 195 Johnson’s definition of “essential” is far stricter than defining that term as
a synonym of “convenient” or “useful.”
A sixth word that Johnson uses as a synonym for “necessary” is “indispensable”: “1) Not
to be remitted; not to be spared; necessary.” 196 Woodw. is quoted here as saying “Rocks,
mountains, and caverns, against which these exceptions are made, are of indispensable use and
necessity, as well to earth as to man.”

Here again, “indispensable” is not a synonym of

“convenient” or useful.
We have suggested that in addition to “needful” being the most promising synonym for
“necessary” in Article I, Section 8, clause 18, a more modern test of “congruence and
proportionality,” like the one City of Boerne v. Flores used to interpret “appropriate” in Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, might work very well as a modern synonym for “necessary and
proper.” Samuel Johnson defines the noun “congruence” in the following terms: “Agreement;
suitableness of one thing to another; consistency.” 197 He defines the noun “congruity” as meaning:
“1) Suitableness; agreeableness; 2) fitness, pertinence; 3) consequence of argument; reason;
consistency . . ..” 198

Johnson defined “congruence” used as an adjective as meaning: “1)

agreement; suitableness of one thing to another; consistency.” 199 Johnson defines the noun
“proportional” as meaning: “Having a settled comparative relation; having a certain degree of any
quality compared with something else.” 200 Johnson then defines the adjective “proportionate”:
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“Adjusted to something else, according to a certain rate or comparative relation.” 201 As Locke
says: “In the state of nature, one man comes by no absolute power to use a criminal according to
the passions or heats of his own will, but only to retribute to him, so far as convenience dictates,
what is proportionate to his transgressions.”
In sum, the best dictionary definitions of “necessary” from Johnson’s Dictionary are
“needful and proper” or “congruent and proportional.” In fact, if one goes purely by the dictionary
definition, one might even think that the best meaning is the strict one advanced by Jefferson and
the State of Maryland. At the very least, there is no support for the Hamilton/Marshall position.
If one looks at the other dictionaries available during the founding era, nothing changes.
For definitions of “necessary,” one will find: “Needful, indispensably requisite; conclusive,
decisive by inevitable consequence; fatal, impelled by fate.” 202

“Needful, unavoidable,

indispensable.” 203 “That which must be indispensably done or granted; that without which a thing
cannot exist; impelled by an irresistible principle; conclusive; followed by inevitable
consequence.” 204 “Needful, requisite, indispensable, unavoidable, inevitable, fatal, conclusive,
decisive.” 205 “Needful, fatal, conclusive.” 206 “Needful; indispensably requisite; not free; impelled
by fate; conclusive, decisive by inevitable consequence.” 207 For definitions of “needful,” one
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finds: “necessary, wanting”; 208 “necessary, useful”; 209 “necessary; not to be done without;
indispensably requisite”; 210 and “necessary, indispensably requisite.” 211
The prosecution rests.
None of this linguistic evidence is surprising once one grasps the etymological roots of
“necessary.”

One finds in the Barnhart Dictionary of Etymology: “About 1380,

necessarie needed, required, essential, in Chaucer's translation of Boethius' De Consolatione
Philosophiae; borrowed, perhaps in some instances through Old French necessaire, and directly
from Latin necessarius, from necesse unavoidable, indispensable, necessary; originally, no
backing away (ne -not + Latin cessis withdrawal, an abstract noun to cedere withdraw; see.
CEDE).” 212

A founding generation well schooled in Latin 213 would have understood the

significance of a term drawn from “necessarius.”
There is one final dictionary definition of the word “necessary” which we think it is helpful
to understand and which explains why modern readers should be outraged by Hamilton and
Marshall’s cavalier reading of “necessary” to mean “convenient” or “useful.” Noah Webster’s
1828 American Dictionary of the English Language, which was the first dictionary of English as
spoken in the United States rather than the United Kingdom, had the same sturdy definition of
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necessary as did Samuel Johnson’s dictionary published in 1755 in Great Britain. Webster defined
“necessary” as an adjective as follows:
1) That must be; that cannot be otherwise; indispensably requisite. It is
necessary that every effect should have a cause.

2) Indispensible; requisite;

essential; that cannot be otherwise without preventing the purpose intended. Air is
necessary to support animal life; food is necessary to nourish the body; holiness is
a necessary qualification for happiness; health is necessary to the enjoyment of
pleasure; subjection to law is necessary to the safety of persons and property. 3)
Unavoidable; as a necessary inference or consequence from fact or arguments. 4)
acting from necessity or compulsion; opposed to free. Whether man is a necessary
or a free agent is a question much discussed. 214
These quotations are of critical importance because they show that in the United States, as
well as in the United Kingdom, nine years after John Marshall tried to redefine “necessary” to
mean “convenient” or “useful,” ordinary Americans -- and not Britisher poets, playwrights, and
political philosophers or lawyers -- were still reading necessary to mean “needful” or “congruent
and proportional” and not to mean “useful” or “convenient.” As a matter of dictionary usage, both
Samuel Johnson and Noah Webster agreed that “necessary” meant a whole lot more than
“convenient” or “useful.” This does not necessarily mean that McCulloch v. Maryland was
wrongly decided. The law creating the Bank of the United States, without its objectionable
monopoly feature, may well have been “needful and proper” or “proportional” or “congruent.” It
does mean, however, that the famous dictum from Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch
v. Maryland should be confined to the ashbin of history.
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IV. Corpus Linguistics Analysis of “Necessary”

In our quest to undercover the original meaning of “necessary” in Article I, Section 8,
clause 18, we rely not only on dictionaries, but also on a new technique for uncovering original
public meaning called corpus linguistics. This technique allows us to prove that ordinary
American, and some United Kingdom. speakers of English, in fact agreed with our reliance on
some of the dictionary definitions discussed above. We firmly believe, based on a corpus
linguistics analysis, that the Framing generation meant “necessary” to mean at least “needful” and
not “convenient” or “useful” and that this conclusion on our part was not merely an artifact of the
Framers’ reliance on Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language of 1755 or 1785. The
test that should be used for the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause is the test of whether
a law is “needful and proper” or, in modern terms, whether it is “congruent and proportional.”
We agree with former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia that dictionaries are an
invaluable guide to knowing the original public meaning of the words of a constitutional or
statutory text. Nonetheless, dictionaries are not infallible. Johnson’s Dictionary, for example,
quotes primarily playwrights, poets, and political philosophers and high-achieving lawyers in
offering his definitions. He thus says that “commerce” means more than buy, sell, or travel
because a poet talked about having commerce with God! 215 Forgive us for being skeptical, but
an ordinary Englishmen might very well not have used the word “commerce” in such a
highfaluting way. It may be that Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary was too upper crust to catch the
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meaning ordinary speakers of English in the United States and in the United Kingdom had in 1787.
The United Kingdom, for example, contains a notorious caste system of which language and accent
are but a part. A potential solution to this problem is the growing appeal of corpus linguistics as a
supplement to or even a replacement for dictionaries.
Corpus linguistics is thus a research tool quickly gaining popularity among originalist
scholars. Section A of this Part introduces corpus linguistics and describes its strengths and
weaknesses. Section B explains this article’s methodology in using corpus linguistics to determine
the original public meaning of “necessary” and to consider whether “convenient” or “useful” are
synonyms for “necessary.” The subsequent sections test the primary textual and linguistic
arguments of the McCulloch decision. Section C examines whether the synonyms proposed by
counsel for McCulloch and accepted by the Court were actually closer in meaning to the word
“necessary” compared to the synonyms proposed by counsel for Maryland. Section D tests the
assertion by counsel for McCulloch, ultimately incorporated into the opinion, that the meaning of
the word “necessary” may be qualified by comparative words, such as “more,” “most,” or “very.”
Finally, Section E assesses Marshall’s linguistic conclusion that the word “necessary,” when used
in conjunction with the word “proper,” meant something less than “indispensable.”

A. Introduction to Corpus Linguistics

Corpus linguistics represents a novel approach to originalist research. 216 In order to make
an argument based on the original public meaning of a text, it can be helpful to establish how
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words were used by ordinary Americans at the time a given constitutional provision was
adopted. 217 However, researchers have often struggled to find relevant sources, “at least in
sufficient quantity,” 218 to make such arguments. Relying on a small number of hand-selected texts
can give rise to suspicions that the author has “cherry picked” sources. 219 Dictionaries can provide
evidence of the range of permissible uses of a word, but they are not always helpful for identifying
a single ordinary meaning. 220 Moreover, dictionaries typically do not define phrases consisting of
more than one word. 221 Corpus-linguistic research attempts to fill this void by importing the rigor
of social science methodologies into historical research on original meaning. Its use is premised
on the idea that “[t]he common usage of a given term in a given context is an empirical matter that
may be quantified through corpus-based methodologies.” 222
A corpus is a searchable database of texts. It may be general, containing materials from
various genres, or subject-matter specific, such as a corpus of Supreme Court opinions. The
databases often contain thousands of texts, 223 alleviating concerns over small sample sizes.
Searches yield objective results that can be described quantitively. Corpuses are often used to
perform “concordance” and “collocate” analyses. A “concordance” lists sentences, excerpted from
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texts in the database, that contain a certain keyword. A concordance analysis is useful for learning
about the contexts in which words are used. 224 “Collocates” are the words that most frequently
appear nearby a keyword. A researcher can limit his analysis to words that appear immediately
before or after a keyword, or she can search for the words that most commonly appear within three
or four words of the keyword.

Collocate research is consistent with the canon of textual

interpretation noscitur a sociis, which suggests that a word can be “known by its associates.”225
According to one scholar, though imperfect, a “concordance analysis . . . taken together with . . .
collocation output, [can] demonstrate[] to a high degree of certainty” the ordinary meaning of a
word. 226
This methodology’s appeal is not purely academic. Courts across the country have
indicated that they are open to considering corpus-linguistics based textual arguments. For
example, Utah Supreme Court Justice Thomas Lee, a pioneer in the application of corpus-linguistic
methods to legal analysis, has not only published multiple academic articles on the topic, 227 but
has also relied on corpus methods from the bench. 228 In 2016, the Supreme Court of Michigan
turned to corpus methods to interpret the meaning of the word “information” in a statute and,
specifically, to determine whether it could encompass false as well as true statements. 229 Based
on a collocate analysis, the court established that the word “information” was “regularly used in
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People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832, 838-39 (Mich. 2016).
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conjunction with adjectives suggesting it may be both true and false.” 230 It confirmed this finding
using more contextualized concordance research. 231 The court expressed confidence in this new
methodology, asserting that “corpus linguistics . . . is consistent with how courts have understood
statutory interpretation.” 232
Corpus-linguistic methods have even found a receptive audience in the U.S. Supreme
Court. The Court had informally relied on corpus methods before corpus linguistics was a
recognized methodology of textual interpretation among legal academics. For example, one set of
scholars described the majority opinion in Muscarello v. United States 233—in which Justice Breyer
performed searches in newspaper databases in order to assess the ordinary meaning of the phrase
“carries a firearm”—as “a corpuslite analysis.” 234 More recently, the Court appeared to have been
influenced by a corpus-linguistic analysis in an amicus brief in the case FCC v. AT&T. 235 Finally,
in a 2018 dissent, Justice Thomas cited corpuses for the proposition that “[t]he phrase
‘expectation(s) of privacy’ does not appear in . . . collections of early American English texts.”236
Although corpus linguistics shows great promise as a methodology, it should by no means
be held up as the silver bullet of originalist research. For instance, no single clear meaning may
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Id. at 839 & n.33.
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Id. at 839 & n.34.
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Id. at 839 n.29 (emphasis omitted).
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524 U.S. 125 (1998).
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Phillips,Ortner & Lee, supra note 218, at 27.
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stand out in an analysis. 237 In such cases, corpus research causes no harm; it simply fails to answer
the question at hand. More concerningly, the methodology requires the researcher to make
judgment calls related to research design and interpretation, which could open the door to bias. 238
In particular, concordance analysis may be susceptible to so-called “confirmation bias,” which
may cause a researcher to “perceive[] the words in the data presented” in a way that favors his
preferred outcome. 239 Finally, the researcher must decide whether to interpret the meaning of an
“abstract concept[] . . . thickly to include specific examples of the concept or thinly to define only
the concept itself.” 240
This law review article hopes to largely avoid these pitfalls. First, it does not seek a single,
definitive meaning of the word “necessary” but rather attempts to test a series of specific linguistic
arguments. Second, although judgment calls are an inescapable reality of research design, this
article attempts to be as transparent as possible regarding its methods and assumptions. In theory,
this transparency would enable third parties to replicate the research and determine whether any
variations of methodology might alter the conclusion. 241 In order to avoid confirmation bias, this
article relies on quantitative analyses of collocates in addition to an admittedly more subjective
concordance analysis. Even the concordance analysis, however, employs objective sampling
methods, and the relevant excerpts are made available in the Appendix, 242 leaving readers free to
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draw their own conclusions. Finally, the article interprets the meaning of the word “necessary”
thinly and does not address whether specific concrete examples may fall within its definition.
Certainly, the purpose of this article is not to relitigate the question of whether the national bank
itself was “necessary.”
While even the most earnest proponents of corpus linguistics concede that the methodology
may not necessarily be “the best tool for determining the meaning of words,” at a minimum, it can
serve to “point [researchers] in directions to further explore.” 243 The fact that the linguistic
arguments in McCulloch fail to align with the evidence produced by a corpus-linguistic analysis
does not establish the original meaning of the word “necessary.” It demonstrates only what the
original meaning most likely was not.

B. Methodology

This article employs five corpuses that vary across important dimensions: four are
American and one is British; three are general and two are specialized; and only one covers the
entire time period of interest (1760-1849). The first two analyses rely exclusively on the American
corpuses. The final analysis, which seeks to escape the Constitution’s influence on language use,
draws on the British corpus as well as an American corpus containing texts published before 1787.

Table 1: Key Characteristics of Corpuses
Corpus
Country
Corpus
of United States
Founding Era
American
English
243

Years
1760-1799

Lee & Phillips, supra note 216, at 302.
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Specialization Details
General
https://lcl.byu.edu/
projects/cofea/

(COFEA)
Corpus
Historical
American
English
(COHA)

of United States

1810-2000

General

https://www.englishcorpora.org/coha/help/
texts.asp

1500-2010

General

Corpus of U.S. United States
Supreme Court
Opinions

1790-present

Specialized

https://www.englishcorpora.org/googlebooks/
help/tour_e.asp
https://www.englishcorpora.org/scotus/help/
texts.asp

Hansard
England
Corpus (British
Parliament)

1803-2010

Specialized

Google Books

United States

https://www.englishcorpora.org/hansard/help/
texts.asp

In order to capture changes in language use over time, the results of the first two analyses
are presented with respect to three distinct, thirty-year timeframes: the three decades leading up to
the Constitutional Convention (1760-1789); the three decades between the Convention and the
McCulloch decision (1790-1819); and the three decades following the McCulloch decision (18201849). Unfortunately, most of the corpuses do not contain texts spanning from 1760 to 1849.
Thus, statistics describing the first time period reflect texts drawn from the COFEA and Google
Books corpuses. Statistics describing the second time period reflect texts drawn from the COFEA,
COHA, Google Books, and Supreme Court corpuses. Statistics describing the third time period
reflect texts drawn from the COHA, Google Books and Supreme Court corpuses. Employing
multiple corpuses in each period should diminish any concerns raised by reliance on different
corpuses in assessing texts from different time periods.
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The three analyses are, at a high level, designed to be consistent with the standard academic
approach to corpus linguistics research. However, because this article seeks to test the specific
linguistic arguments advanced in McCulloch, it must apply traditional methods of corpus analysis
in creative ways. 244 It is hoped that transparency of execution will compensate for novelty of
design.
It is common practice to gain insight into the meaning of a word by assessing its most
common collocates. However, this article is not simply interested in the meaning of the word
“necessary.” Section IV.C attempts to determine whether the word “necessary” is more similar in
meaning to the synonyms selected by Chief Justice Marshall or the synonyms proposed by counsel
for the State of Maryland. Thus, it evaluates the overlap between the top collocates of the word
“necessary” and its proposed synonyms. Likewise, Section IV.D seeks to test Marshall’s assertion
that the meaning of the word “necessary” is frequently qualified in degree by words of comparison.
That section analyzes the frequency with which “necessary” is qualified by—or, in practice,
immediately preceded by—such words. 245 However, because this information is meaningless in
isolation, Section IV.D also assesses how frequently the proposed synonyms are qualified by
words of comparison. Finally, Section IV.E examines the use of the phrase “necessary and proper”
using a traditional concordance analysis.
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For example, “sense analysis” involves coding the “sense” in which a word is used in a sample of excerpts. Lee
and Phillips described sense analysis as the “meat-and-potatoes of determining meaning from corpus analysis,” but it
is not as well-suited to addressing the specific arguments made in the McCulloch opinion. See Lee & Phillips, supra
note 216, at 308-09.
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Frequency is measured as the percentage of the occurrences of the word in a database in which that word is
qualified. Again, this methodology does not represent a significant departure from the standard approach. Sense
analyses, likewise, may measure the percentage of instances in a sample in which a word is used in a given sense.
See, e.g., id. at 299.
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C. Synonyms of “Necessary”

During oral arguments, counsel for both McCulloch and the State of Maryland proposed
various synonyms for the word “necessary,” in an effort to establish its meaning. Arguing for
McCulloch, Daniel Webster suggested that “necessary” was synonymous with “proper,”
“suitable,” “fitted,” “best,” and “most useful.” 246 The Attorney General claimed that “necessary”
meant “useful,” “appropriate,” “needful,” or “adapted.” 247 On behalf of Maryland, Walter Jones
argued that “necessary” meant “needful” in the sense of “indispensably requisite.” 248 In the end,
writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Marshall equated “necessary” with the words
“convenient,” “useful,” and “essential.” This Section aims to test whether Marshall truly chose
the closest synonyms among those proposed.
A synonym has “the same or nearly the same meaning” as another word. 249 Perfect
synonyms can be used interchangeably. If two words are close synonyms, they should be
frequently used in similar contexts and, as a result, surrounded by similar words. The following
analysis compares the collocates associated with the word “necessary” to those associated with the
synonyms proposed by Maryland and the synonyms adopted by the Court. On behalf of Maryland,
we selected the only two synonyms proposed: “needful” and “requisite.” On behalf of the
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McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 324-25 (1819) (argument by Mr. Webster) (“‘[N]ecessary and proper’ . . .
are probably to be considered as synonymous. Necessarily, powers must here intend such powers as are suitable
and fitted to the object; such as are best and most useful in relation to the end proposed.”).
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Id. at 356 (argument by the Attorney General) (“The auxiliary means, which are necessary for this purpose, are
those which are useful and appropriate to produce the particular end. ‘Necessary and proper’ are, then, equivalent to
needful and adapted . . . .”).
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Id. at 366-67 (argument by Mr. Jones) (“The word ‘necessary,’ is said to be a synonyme of ‘needful.’ But both
these words are defined ‘indispensably requisite;’ and, most certainly, this is the sense in which the word ‘necessary’
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Synonym, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2020), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/synonym.
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victorious party and the Court, we selected “convenient,” and “useful,” two of the three synonyms
mentioned in the opinion. The third synonym, “essential,” is omitted from this analysis because it
was closer in meaning 250 to the synonyms suggested by counsel for Maryland and might, therefore,
muddle the results of the analysis.
For each of the five words—“necessary,” “needful,” “requisite,” “useful,” and
“convenient”—we identified the top twenty collocates in each of the American corpuses that
contained texts published in the given timeframe. Specifically, we searched for collocates within
three words on either side of the keyword. 251 If a corpus only included texts from a portion of the
relevant timeframe, we identified the top collocates in that corpus for the portion of the timeframe
for which texts were available. As a rule, we excluded “stop words,” 252 proper nouns, and
collocates that only appeared once. If the twentieth collocate was tied in frequency with other
collocates, we included all of the collocates that occurred with the same frequency (unless there
were more than ten).
Using the statistical programming software R, we then identified the overlap between the
top collocates of “necessary” in each corpus and the top collocates of a given synonym in each
corpus, within each of the three time periods. For instance, if “absolutely” were a top collocate of
“necessary” only in the COFEA corpus and a top collocate of “requisite” only in the Google Books
corpus, a match would still be generated. This methodology maximized the possibility of
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Essential, JOHNSON, supra note 191, at 721 (defining “essential” as “[n]ecessary to the constitution or existence of
any thing” and “[i]mportant in the highest degree; principal”).
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Because the Google Books corpus does not allow simultaneous searches for collocates on either side of a word, we
identified the top ten collocates within three spaces before and after the search term.
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Consistent with common practice by corpus linguistics researchers, we excluded “stop words” (i.e., “and,” “if,” or
“what”) from any list of collocates, using a standard collection of these words. See Full-Text Stopwords, MY SQL,
https://dev.mysql.com/doc/refman/8.0/en/fulltext-stopwords.html (providing a list of “default stopwords”). It should
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identifying overlapping collocates in each time period. One notable shortcoming, however, was
the inability to match similar words with their plurals or other tenses. 253
Table 2 shows the overlap among the top collocates of “necessary” and the proposed
synonyms in the three decades leading up to the convention, the three decades between the
convention and the McCulloch decision, and the three decades following the McCulloch decision.
While the overlapping collocates vary somewhat across time, the overall trends do not. The two
synonyms advocated by counsel for Maryland—“requisite” and “needful”—have more numerous
and more substantive overlapping collocates. The overlapping collocates include adverbs such as
“absolutely,” “essentially,” and “indispensably,” which convey the mandatory sense in which the
words are used. Likewise, nouns such as “defence,” “supplies,” “sustain,” and “support” indicate
that the objects of necessity were serious matters. It is hard to imagine a “defence” or “support”
being described as simply convenient.

The verb “enable” connotes something vital to

accomplishing an end.
Conversely, the words which the Supreme Court purported to identify as synonyms—
“convenient” and “useful”—share few collocates with “necessary.” The overlapping collocates
consist largely of generic words such as “rendered,” “judged,” and “thought,” which provide little
insight into any shared meaning. In fact, such words can be used in connection with words of very
different meanings. For example, it is equally acceptable to say that something has been “rendered”
or “judged” “unnecessary” as to say that something has been “rendered” or “judged” “necessary.”
The words “information,” “execution,” and “proper” similarly provide little insight into
substantive meaning.
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For example, “deem” would not be matched with “deemed,” nor would “supply” be matched with “supplies.”
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In sum, the results of the analysis strongly indicate that “necessary” is used in contexts
more similar to those in which “requisite” and “needful” are used. Thus, the synonyms proposed
by counsel for Maryland were likely more accurate than those adopted by the Supreme Court.

Table 2: Overlapping Collocates
Synonym
Needful

1760-1789
Absolutely
Judge
Judged
Supplies
Support
Thought

1790-1819
Absolutely
Deemed

1820-1849
Carry
Deem
Preparations
Support
Sustain

Requisite

Absolutely
Defence
Essentially
Highly
Indispensably
Supplies

Absolutely
Carry
Deem
Deemed
Indispensably
Means
Supplies
Thought

Absolutely
Deemed
Defray
Enable
Indispensably
Information
Render

Useful

Render
Rendered

Render
Rendered
Thought

Information
Render

Convenient

Judge
Judged

Execution
Proper

Render

D. Qualification by Words of Comparison

Arguing on behalf of McCulloch, Mr. Pinkney stated that the word “necessary” “may be
qualified by the addition of adverbs of diminution or enlargement, such as very, indispensably,

74

more, less, or absolutely necessary.” 254 The Court was convinced. Chief Justice Marshall wrote
that the word “necessary” “has not a fixed character, peculiar to itself. It admits of all degrees of
comparison; and is often connected with other words, which increase or diminish the impression
the mind receives of the urgency it imports.” 255 The analysis in this Section tests that argument.
As the Chief Justice recognized, the fact that a word is frequently used in conjunction with
comparative words may indicate that the word can be understood to vary by degree. However, not
all words can be qualified in this manner. For instance, to many English speakers, the phrase “very
mandatory” may sound awkward while the phrase “very important” may not. The great British
novelist George Orwell capitalized upon this distinction in his book Animal Farm. When the pigs
had firmly established themselves as the governing elites of the farm, they issued a new rule: “All
animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others.” 256 Of course, the irony lies in
the fact that the concept of equality does not lend itself to qualification by degree. Either all of the
animals on the farm are equal or they are not. According to this logic, if the meaning of
“necessary” can be qualified, the word should frequently be preceded by comparative words such
as “very,” “more,” or “most.” If not, it should rarely be preceded by such words.
To test this proposition, we found the percentage of occurrences of the word “necessary”—
in each of the American corpuses and in each timeframe—in which “necessary” was immediately
preceded by “very,” “more,” or “most.” Using the search feature in each corpus, we found the
number of times a phrase (e.g., “very necessary”) occurred and divided it by the total number of

254
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times the keyword (e.g., “necessary”) occurred in that same time period. 257 To provide context,
we collected the same statistics for the words “needful,” “requisite,” “convenient,” and “useful.”
Finally, we calculated the average percentage of occurrences 258 in which the words were qualified
by comparative words in each timeframe across corpuses.
Table 3 shows the average percentage of occurrences in which each set of words was
qualified by a given comparative word. Across time, “necessary” is rarely preceded by the
comparative words “more,” “most,” and “very.” Likewise, the synonyms proposed by counsel for
Maryland were rarely preceded by comparative words. These findings indicate that “necessary,”
like “needful” and “requisite,” does not lend itself to qualification. Similar to the word “equal” in
the example from Animal Farm, it may simply not be possible to conceive of these words as
varying by degree. Conversely, the synonyms accepted by the Supreme Court, “convenient” and
“useful,” are frequently qualified. In fact, they are qualified by the words “more,” “most,” or
“very” in one fifth of the instances in which they appear in the historical corpus texts. Not only is
the difference large, but it is also statistically significant, and controlling for the corpus used and
timeframe analyzed leads to no observable change in the results. 259 The results indicate that Chief
Justice Marshall was right to recognize that some words may be qualified by “degrees of
comparison,” but the word “necessary” is apparently not among them.

Table 3: Qualification by Comparative Words
Keyword
Necessary

“More”

“Most”

1760-1789: 0.68%

1760-1789:

“Very”
0.51%

1760-1789: 0.54%

257

Combined
1760-1789: 1.73%

Because the Google Books corpus does not allow for searches of multi-word phrases, we used the collocate feature
to determine the number of times a qualifying word immediately preceded the keyword.
258

The results are essentially the same when median is used instead of average.
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See Appendix.A (regression analysis).
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1790-1819: 0.91%
1820-1849: 0.68%

1790-1819: 0.54%
1820-1849: 0.44%

1790-1819: 0.31%
1820-1849: 0.26%

1790-1819: 1.76%
1820-1849: 1.37%

& 1760-1789: 0.52%
1790-1819: 0.42%
1820-1849: 0.81%

1760-1789: 0.23%
1790-1819: 2.33%
1820-1849: 1.2%

1760-1789: 0.91%
1790-1819: 0.31%
1820-1849: 0.15%

1760-1789: 1.66%
1790-1819: 3.07%
1820-1849: 2.15%

Convenient & 1760-1789: 7.09%
Useful
1790-1819: 6.58%
1820-1849: 7.66%

1760-1789: 7.5%
1790-1819: 8.39%
1820-1849: 8.64%

1760-1789: 5.31%
1790-1819: 2.87%
1820-1849: 3.59%

1760-1789: 19.9%
1790-1819: 17.85%
1820-1849: 19.88%

Needful
Requisite

Finally, the fact that “absolutely” and “indispensably”—both “degree adverbs” 260—are
among the most common collocates of “necessary,” “needful,” and “requisite” 261 does not
undermine the argument advanced in this Section. Chief Justice Marshall cites “necessary, very
necessary, absolutely [and] indispensably necessary” 262 as equivalent examples, all of which
demonstrate that the word “necessary” can be understood to vary by degree. However, this
articlesuggests that the frequent collocates of “necessary” and the prototypical comparative words
(i.e., “more,” “most,” and “very”) serve different purposes.
As described above, the adverbs “very,” “more” and “most” imply the possibility of
something “less.”

Conversely, “absolutely” and “indispensably” do not carry the same

connotation. If “necessary” is understood in its strictest sense, then an adverb that simply reaffirms
that meaning does not actually qualify it. In other words, the phrase “absolutely necessary” does
not necessarily imply that something less than “absolute” necessity is possible. Returning one last
time to the example from Animal Farm, had the pigs instead asserted that all animals were

260
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grammar/adverbs-types.
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See infra Section III.C.
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McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 413-14 (1819).
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https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/grammar/british-

“completely equal” or “absolutely equal,” no reader would have inferred that some lesser degree
of equality must have been possible.

(The only collocate that potentially cuts against this

conclusion is “highly,” a frequent collocate of both “necessary” and “requisite” in the years leading
up to the ratification of the Constitution.)

E. “Necessary and Proper” as a Phrase

Finally, Chief Justice Marshall suggested that the meaning of the word “necessary” was
altered by its inclusion in the phrase “necessary and proper.” In his opinion, Marshall wrote:
If the word ‘necessary’ was used in that strict and rigorous sense for which the
counsel for the state of Maryland contend, it would be an extraordinary departure
from the usual course of the human mind . . . to add a word, the only possible offect
[sic] of which is, to qualify that strict and rigorous meaning . . . . 263
Although some modern scholars have reached similar conclusions, 264 this article is not the first to
question Marshall’s assertion. Gary Lawson and Patricia Granger, for instance, have suggested
that, between the words “necessary” and “proper,” “proper” was “the more restrictive term” 265 -or, more precisely, that it describes a different set of restrictions than does “necessary.” This
Section explores whether the phrase “necessary and proper” conveys a less “rigorous” meaning
than would the word “necessary” alone.

263

Id. at 418-19.

264
See, e.g., Bray, supra note 136, at 737 (suggesting that the word “proper” “modifies and moderates ‘necessary,’”
serving “as a rule of construction against taking ‘necessary’ in its strict, Jeffersonian sense”).
.
265
Lawson & Granger, supra note 23, at 289.
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To test this proposition, we performed a concordance analysis, examining excerpts of
historical texts in which the phrase was used. This question is well suited to concordance analysis
because it requires an investigation into nuanced meaning that would be all but impossible to
capture without context. Because the inclusion of the phrase “necessary and proper” in the
Constitution may have influenced its use in American texts after 1787, we relied on examples from
an American corpus in the years 1770 to 1786 and from a British corpus containing parliamentary
debates in the years 1803 to 1819. 266 The phrase only appeared six times in the British corpus, so
we analyzed all six excerpts. We selected six of the first seven 267 excerpts returned from the
American corpus. 268 The results are included in the appendix at the end of thisarticle.
As used in the historical texts, the phrase “necessary and proper” does not appear to mean
anything less than “indispensable.” The concordance excerpts address such varied and high-stakes
topics as planting a spy, performing military duties, acknowledging the sacrifices of war,
establishing courts, removing judges, and solidifying alliances. For instance, one excerpt refers to
“perform[ing] all the duties that are necessary and proper for a Quarter-Master General.” In
another example, an officer explains to then-General George Washington that the Continental
Army “undoubtedly [had] a Spy on [a certain] Island, Every necessary and Proper preparation
having been made for that Purpose.” Across the Atlantic, John Adams promised that he “shall be
ready in behalf of the United States to do, whatever is necessary and proper” once the King of
France was prepared to invite the United States to accede to a treaty of alliance. In England,
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The Hansard Corpus begins in the year 1803. We analyzed texts spanning sixteen years in both corpuses.
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We excluded one excerpt that was jumbled to the point of being nearly incomprehensible. The search results were
not returned in date order or according to any other metric that might lead to a biased sample, as far as we can tell.
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The Corpus of Founding Era American English was the only corpus that contained texts from this era and allowed
searches of multi-word phrases. Although Google Books also contains texts from the eighteenth century, its current
format does not permit searches of strings containing more than one word.
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members of the House of Lords discussed how “a judge may be guilty of several acts . . . which
would render his removal necessary and proper.” None of the forgoing examples lends itself well
to a more flexible understanding of the phrase “necessary and proper.” In fact, if one replaces the
phrase “necessary and proper” with “requisite” or “convenient” as one reads, it becomes all the
more apparent that the phrase should not be understood to mean anything less than
“indispensable.”
Only one example potentially cuts against this conclusion. In a sermon, an American
pastor asserted that it is “fit,” “wise,” and “necessary and proper” that the legislature align man’s
laws with God’s laws. Certainly, the words “fit” and “wise” do not imply that the desired action
is mandatory. Nonetheless, the pastor seems to assert that only fear of eternal damnation will
restrain people from making poor choices. Thus, citizens will only obey the laws of man if they
align with the laws of God. 269 No manner of legislation would be effective other than that deemed
“necessary and proper.” If this interpretation is correct, the meaning of “necessary and proper”
would be relatively consistent with the strict meaning that the other excepts suggest.

V. A Brief Note on Agency Law and State Constitutions

Hamilton and Marshall made an argument about common usage, so we have focused our
attention on common usage as well. It is quite possible, however, that common usage is the wrong
place to look for the meaning of “necessary” in the Necessary and Proper Clause.

The

Constitution, after all, is not an act of common speech. It is a legal document, written in the
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George Beckwith, Address at North-Parish (Jan. 26, 1783), https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/evans/N14091.0001.001/
1:2?rgn=div1;view=fulltext.
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language of the law. 270 Much of the “legal English” in the Constitution overlaps with ordinary
English, and in those circumstances ordinary meaning and legal meaning are the same. But there
are some terms in the Constitution that are unlikely to be part of common parlance. Other terms
may appear in both common and technical parlance but shift meanings as they move from one
context to the other.
The Necessary and Proper Clause seems to inhabit a twilight zone between common and
technical speech.

The phrase “necessary and proper” could readily appear in common

discourse, 271 but could also appear in specialized legal contexts, such as agency instruments or
corporate charters. Those agency-law usages, as we have explained, were accessible to ordinary
people in a way that some technical legalisms (“Bill of Attainder” or “Privileges and Immunities”)
might not have been, but the phrase would be understood to hold a meaning in those agency-law
settings that might differ from its meaning in common speech.
This actually cuts against the position taken by Jefferson and the State of Maryland. As a
matter of pure linguistic meaning, drawn from dictionaries and corpus linguistics, one could easily
conclude that the best meaning of “necessary” is indeed something like “indispensable.” That is
not, however, how the term was generally understood in the specific context of agency instruments.
Incidental powers were “necessary” if they were indispensable, but also if they were significantly
important to the principal power. For example, a conveyance of a pond would carry as a necessary
incident conveyance of the fish because the fish “are so annexed to and so necessary to the wellbeing of the inheritance, that they shall accompany the land wherever it vests.” 272 A power might
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also be necessary, and therefore incident, if customarily accompanied a principal power. “For
example, a factor (a person selling goods as an agent for someone else) could have the incidental
power to extent credit to the customer if that was customarily a power held by factors of that
type.” 273 Because the Constitution is an agency instrument, this agency-law meaning is a better
account of the phrase “necessary and proper” in Article I than would be the ordinary-language
meaning relied on by Jefferson and Maryland. It is also a far better account than Hamilton and
Marshall’s suggestion of “useful” or “convenient.” One could certainly write an eighteenthcentury agency instrument that gave an agent the power to use any means that were useful or
convenient. But one would do so by specifying in the instrument that the agent had such discretion,
perhaps by saying that the agent could use whatever means the agent deemed convenient,
appropriate, or even necessary. 274 There are clauses in the Constitution that confer such discretion
on governmental actors, but the Necessary and Proper Clause is not among them.275
All of the conclusions in this article are confirmed by looking at what might be the most
persuasive source for the meaning of “necessary” in a late eighteenth-century American
constitution: Other late eighteenth-century American constitutions. The state constitutions crafted
between 1776 and 1787 often used “necessary” and other adjectives, both alone and in
combination. One of us has elsewhere catalogued and analyzed every such usage. 276 The bottom
line is that “[t[here was no usage of the term ‘necessary’ in state constitutions in which the term
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unambiguously means nothing more than ‘helpful’ or ‘related to in a rational fashion.’ ” 277 When
state constitutions meant “convenient,” they said “convenient.” 278

VI. Caselaw Reconsidered

We think we have established beyond a reasonable doubt that Hamilton and Marshall were
simply wrong about both the ordinary usage of “necessary” and its meaning in the context of the
Necessary and Proper Clause That is all that we set out to establish. It seems to us, however, that
we can venture one step further.
The alternative definition of “necessary” to “convenient” or “useful” put forward in
McCulloch, which equates “necessary” with “indispensable,” would likely be correct if the term
arose in an ordinary conversation. But in the specific context of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
which is designed to confirm and clarify rather than eliminate the incidental power of Congress,
that strict definition is a poor fit. James Madison, recall, put forth a definition for “necessary” that
falls between the extreme positions argued in McCulloch. For Madison, a law is necessary if it
exhibits a “definite connection between means and ends” and links the incidental and principal
power “by some obvious and precise affinity.” 279 That intermediate account is consistent with the
background rules of agency law for incidental powers; “if there were no Sweeping Clause, one
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would likely infer something very much like Madison’s standard as an implication from the grant
of enumerated powers.” 280
A full defense of Madison’s position would be a separate article. But it does seem as
though a good way to express what Madison – and the agency-law principles that he echoed – was
aiming for is to say that Congress’s exercise of incidental powers must be congruent and
proportional to the principal power being implemented. That is considerably more demanding
than a test of convenience, usefulness, or rationality, but less demanding than a test of
indispensability. If it is not a perfect expression of the original meaning of “necessary” in the
Necessary and Proper Clause, it is a closer approximation than the available alternatives.
Our challenge to the sanctity of McCulloch’s dictum that “necessary” means “useful” or
“convenient” is bound to raise alarms among some readers that we propose a thorough spring
cleaning of the attic of old federal power cases. That absolutely is not our project in this Article.281
We want to see the Necessary and Proper Clause applied correctly in a proactive way in new cases
that the Supreme Court decides, with a few minor suggestions for over-rulings or clarifications
that do not make much of a change in existing law. Accordingly, we now see what happens if we
substitute a congruence-and-proportionality inquiry for a convenience-and-rationality inquiry into
some of the leading cases dealing with federal power.
We emphasize that we are not here trying to say whether any of those cases are rightly or
wrongly decided, in the abstract. That would involve considerations that go far beyond the scope
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of this article. Rather, we are just trying to assess the consequences of one change in doctrine,
holding all else constant. We thus take for granted the current doctrine on the scope of the
commerce power, the meaning of “proper” and “for carrying into Execution,” the law of separation
of powers, and every other element of doctrine except the cause-effect relationship described by
“necessary.” Nor do we question the application by the Court of those other doctrines in the cases
we discuss. We are trying to isolate the effects of moving to a congruence and proportionality test
for causal necessity. Thus, when we say that a case was decided “correctly,” we mean that it would
come out the same way, all else equal, if one used the correct test for necessity while resolving all
other matters, rightly or wrong as they were actually resolved in that case, in favor of the exercise
of power.
First, on the list of “correctly” decided cases is McCulloch v. Maryland itself. The Bank
may not have been “indispensable” to executing federal fiscal powers, but the causal connection
was “definite,” in Madison’s terms. The Bank of the United States, by issuing banknotes, greatly
facilitated federal action in spending money, taxing money, and paying employees. In theory, this
could have all been done with gold and silver coins, but it would have been a downright nuisance
to have to rely on precious metals for currency – and, importantly, doing so might have curtailed
commerce instead of carrying it into execution. The only feature of the Bank which was likely
unconstitutional on a congruence-and-proportionality test was its establishment as a monopoly
banker for the federal government, as President Andrew Jackson eloquently maintained in vetoing
the renewal of the Bank of the United States. The Supreme Court could have simply refused to
enforce any language about monopoly in the Bank and let matters go after that.
A second controversy over federal power in the antebellum Republic, which pitted
Hamiltonians against Madisonians in the political departments, was the dispute over whether the
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Necessary and Proper Clause allowed Congress to make internal improvements which aided
commerce, like the building of lighthouses, buoys, roads, and canals. 282 That public spending on
such items is congruent and proportionate for carrying into execution the commerce power is today
self-evident, and it would have satisfied the Madisonian standard for a “definite” causal connection
in the early nineteenth century as well. “Clearly, the new nation desperately needed better
infrastructure to integrate the economies of the several states, promote commerce and
communication across its vast territory, and facilitate the commercial and agricultural development
of millions of acres of unused land in the west.” 283
A third controversy that explicitly raised the Necessary and Proper Clause was Congress’s
decision to authorize the printing of paper money during and after the Civil War – a power that
Congress claimed it had under the Necessary and Proper clause, even though Article I, Section 8,
clause 5 only gives Congress the power “To coin money,” which presumes the minting of gold
and silver coins. 284 When President Abraham Lincoln announced that the Treasury would be
printing paper money during the bloody and close-fought U.S. Civil War, the federal budget and
incoming tax revenues were a total mess, and it is not an exaggeration to say that the printing of
paper money was indispensable to the North’s ability to win the war and to suppress the southern
slaveholders’ rebellion. It would easily pass a congruence and proportionality test for causal
connection between means and ends.
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The printing of paper money in peacetime after the Civil War 285 followed the practice of
all the foreign nations of the world, and it was again “congruent and proportional” to the collection
of taxes, the payment of the government’s debts, and the economy’s growth. There were none of
the problems with creation of a monopoly Bank which attended McCulloch v. Maryland.
The next case that roiled the waters as to the scope of the federal Commerce and Necessary
and Proper Clauses is raised by the federal law upheld in Champion v. Ames, 286 which forbade the
carrying, not just selling, of lottery tickets across state lines. As two of us have said:
It is hard to see how carrying an item across State line as a consumer and not as
part of a sales transaction is itself an act of “commerce,” unless one understands
“commerce” to include all human interaction. The mere transport of the item is not
itself a commercial act of buying or selling, though such acts may precede or follow
it. Accordingly, any power that Congress has to regulate the interstate transport of
items comes not from the Commerce Clause but from the Necessary and Proper
Clause, as an incident of the power to regulate true acts of commerce. 287
With that in mind: It would as a practical matter be impossible for the federal government to use
its commerce power to police lottery tickets that were sold, but not those lottery tickets that a friend
carried to you across a state line. The tickets do not care whether they are sold or merely
transported, and there is no way on the face of the tickets to tell what is happening with them.
Thus, Congress can use what Professor Akhil Reed Amar has called “the extension cord of the
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Necessary and Proper Clause” 288 to facilitate its regulation of what was surely a pecuniary market
in interstate gambling.
The next stop in our saga is The Shreveport Rate Cases. 289 The Interstate Commerce
Commission heard a case involving Texas railroads that set lower prices for intrastate shipment of
goods than for out-of-state merchants using Texas rail lines. The Supreme Court ruled, in a
landmark opinion by Associate Justice Charles Evans Hughes, that Congress, and not the States,
controlled interstate commerce, as well as wholly intrastate Texas commerce that has “such a close
and substantial relation to interstate traffic that the control is essential or appropriate to the security
of that traffic, to the efficiency of the interstate service, and to the maintenance of conditions under
which interstate commerce may be conducted upon fair terms and without molestation or
hindrance.” 290 Strictly speaking, the wholly intrastate Texas commerce was not “Commerce
among the several States,” but it was congruent and proportionate to protect federal interstate
commerce by regulating the intrastate commerce that was driving federal commerce out of
business. The Court applied a causal test that was obviously stricter than rational basis. It did not
rely on Marshall’s dictum, so nothing would change if that dictum was rejected.
The next step in the saga came with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 291 a case in which Congress ruled that goods made with child labor could not be
shipped across state lines even if the goods themselves, unlike the pestilence of lottery tickets,
were in and of themselves not a harmful and noxious nuisance. There was obviously buying and
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selling of lumber in a national commercial market going on in Hammer v. Dagenhart, and state
lines were being crossed as in Champion v. Ames. So long as one believes that the power to
regulate includes the power to prohibit, there is no evident congruence or proportionality problem
in Hammer, for the same reason as in Champion: You cannot tell by looking at lumber how it was
made..
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes addressed this issue in his dissent in Hammer v.
Dagenhart. The federal law in Hammer was enacted by the wealthy New England, Northeastern,
and Midwestern States and targeted at competition from poor southern States, which did not have
laws forbidding child labor. Factories were shutting down in New England and re-opening in the
Carolinas because it cost less to produce there, so the companies could lower their prices. This
has the effect of causing what economists call a race to the bottom – the state that pays the lowest
wage gets the most industry moving to it. The U.S. Constitution does not bar races to the bottom,
per se, but where there is constitutional power for the federal government to act, it can end a race
to the bottom by establishing uniform rules. As Justice Holmes wrote in dissent:
The act does not meddle with anything applying to the States. They may
regulate their internal affairs and their domestic commerce as they like. But when
they seek to send their products across the state line they are no longer within their
rights. If there were no Constitution and no Congress their power to cross the line
would depend upon their neighbors.

Under the Constitution such commerce

belongs not to the States but to Congress to regulate. It may carry out its views of
public policy whatever indirect effect they may have on the activities of the States.
Instead of being encountered by a prohibitive tariff at their boundaries the State
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encounters the public policy of the United States which it is for the Congress to
express. 292
In 1941, Justice Holmes’ dissent became the unanimous majority opinion of the Supreme Court in
United States v. Darby Lumber Co. 293
Before that happened, however, the Court decided National Labor Relations Board v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 294 in which the Supreme Court switched from striking down
a significant amount of congressional Commerce Clause legislation to upholding almost all of it.
Along with Darby, it is one of the cornerstones of the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause
jurisprudence today in 2022.
Jones & Laughlin was written by Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, who also wrote the
opinion in the Shreveport Rates Cases. The issue in Jones & Laughlin was whether Congress had
power to pass the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, which for the first time gave employees
in businesses engaged in interstate commerce a federally protected right to unionize. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp. was a national corporation heavily engaged in interstate commerce. It had
commercial operations in Pennsylvania, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Tennessee, New York,
Louisiana, and West Virginia. The company fired ten out of more than 80,000 employees for
trying to form a union. The men sued under the National Labor Relations Act, and the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) ordered Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. to cease and desist from
this unfair labor practice. The company challenged the NLRB’s action in court, arguing based on
prior caselaw that its firing of a mere ten workers had at most an indirect effect on interstate
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commerce. The company also argued, as case law clearly established in 1937, that manufacturing
is not commerce.
Chief Justice Hughes rejected the company’s constitutional challenge:
The fundamental principle is that the power to regulate commerce is the
power to enact ‘all appropriate legislation for its protection and advancement’; to
adopt measures ‘to promote its growth and insure its safety’; ‘to foster protect
control and restrain.’ That power is plenary and may be exerted to protect interstate
commerce ‘no matter what the source of the dangers which threaten it.’ Although
activities may be intrastate in character when separately considered, if they have
such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is
essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens or obstructions,
Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that control. 295
This language obviously sounds more like “congruence and proportionality” than “rational basis.
Chief Justice Hughes also mentioned “[t]he close and intimate effect which brings the subject
within the reach of federal power.” 296 Hughes continued, in language that Chief Justice Rehnquist
later used in United States v. Lopez 297:.
Undoubtedly the scope of this power must be considered in the light of our
dual system of government and may not be expanded so as to embrace effects upon
interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace the, in view of our
complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is
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national and what is local and create a completely centralized government . . . . The
question is necessarily one of degree . . . .
That interstate activities, by reason of close and intimate relation to
interstate commerce, may fall within federal control is demonstrated in the case of
carriers who are engaged in both interstate and intrastate transportation. 298
The last line is obviously a reference to the Shreveport Rate Cases. The overall language,
including the reference to “substantial” effects and “close and intimate” relations, indicates that
nothing would change in this case if the test for necessity was congruence and proportionality. In
all likelihood, that is effectively the test that the Court actually employed.
Although everybody for eighty-five years has called Jones & Laughlin a Commerce Clause
case, it is obviously a Necessary and Proper Clause case instead. Firing and replacing ten intrastate
employees for wanting to unionize a company of more than 80,000 employees is obviously not a
regulation of buying and selling or of travelling across a state line, but it is the regulation of a
wholly intrastate activity that, when aggregated to include all such intrastate actions nationwide,
has, as Chief Justice Hughes quite rightly says, “a close and substantial relation” to interstate
commerce. But the vehicle for regulating those close and substantial relations is the Necessary
and Proper Clause, not the Commerce Clause, which reaches only commerce among the several
States. Thus, even if the four dissenting Justices were correct that “the power of Congress under
the commerce clause does not extend to relations between employers and their employees engaged
in manufacture,” 299 that would not decide the case without also concluding that the Necessary and
Proper Clause could not fill the gap.
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That brings us to United States v. Darby in 1941. Congress had passed the Fair Labor
Standards Act – a federal law which set a nationwide federal minimum wage and maximum hours
of employment, enforced in part via a prohibition on interstate shipment of goods produced in
violation of the Act’s condition. In other words, it used the same strategy that the Court had
rejected in Hammer v. Dagenhart. The Supreme Court overruled Hammer and upheld the law.300
Another part of the Act imposed wage and hour conditions on businesses employing persons
engaged in the production of goods for interstate commerce. That is a step beyond. Many of the
workers affected by the federal Fair Law Standards Act rarely if ever crossed a state line. The
Supreme Court invoked McCulloch v. Maryland, and therefore implicitly the Necessary and
Proper Clause, in reaching its unanimous holding in U.S. v. Darby upholding the law: “The power
of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the regulation of commerce among the
states. It extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise
of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment
of a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.
See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421.” 301 This language sounds more like Marshall’s
dictum than any of the previous cases discusses here. More pointedly, the Court later said that
Congress “may choose the means reasonably adapted to the attainment of the permitted end, even
though they involve control of intrastate activities.” 302 While not quite adoption of a rational basis
test, it comes close, although the Court twice noted that there was a “substantial” effect on
interstate commerce. 303 Nonetheless, we doubt whether anything would change with a congruence
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and proportionality test. The Court found it key that, as with lottery tickets and lumber, goods that
end up in interstate commerce are impossible to distinguish from those that do not:
Congress was not unaware that most manufacturing businesses shipping their
product in interstate commerce make it in their shops without reference to its
ultimate destination and then after manufacture select some of it for shipment
interstate and some intrastate according to the daily demands of their business, and
that it would be practically impossible, without disrupting manufacturing
businesses, to restrict the prohibited kind of production to the particular pieces of
lumber, cloth, furniture or the like which later move in interstate rather than
intrastate commerce. 304
That seems to meet a congruence and proportionality test.
Unfortunately for the law, neither Chief Justice Hughes in Jones & Laughlin nor Chief
Justice Stone in Darby explain that their decisions were actually grounded on the Necessary and
Proper Clause rather than the Commerce Clause. This was harmful for three reasons.
First, it left those on the political right convinced that these two decisions were illegitimate
power grabs since wholly intrastate activities, of which there are many, are obviously not
“Commerce . . . among the several States.” This bred a certain cynicism among lawyers, which
gave fuel to the wrong-headed Legal Realist school that all of law is just politics. Today, that view
is held by many of the people of the United States and by many in Congress, in the White House
and even in the Supreme Court itself. Deciding a critically important opinion like Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp. correctly is simply not good enough. The legitimate constitutional reasons
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for the decision have to be clearly spelled out. Neither Chief Justice Hughes in Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp. nor Chief Justice Stone in United States v. Darby came even close to living up to their
duty to explain how We the People’s constitution had led them inexorably to the decisions they
reached.
The second unfortunate consequence of these two badly written “Commerce Clause”
opinions is that, together with a third opinion which we shall address shortly, they led the American
people and everyone in Congress to think they could pass national laws on any federalism subject
they wanted to with impunity. This led to a lot of bad federal law-making in contexts which were
much closer cases under a congruence-and-proportionality standard than were the contexts in
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. and United States v. Darby.
The third, and final, bad effect is that it led the Court, when it revived some measure of
federalism in United States v. Lopez, to make the new test of what is in the “Commerce Power”
depend on whether “a wholly intrastate activity substantially affected interstate commerce.” That
is not the right test for constitutionality, and it continues to misshape the law. “Commerce among
the several States” means “Commerce among the several States,” and nothing but confusion is
sown by trying to pack “necessary and proper” laws into the unpromising language of the
Commerce Clause. Necessary and proper laws have their own clause, so perhaps the Court should
consider using it.
The last key New Deal so-called Commerce Clause case that is in fact a Necessary and
Proper Clause case which we mention is Wickard v. Filburn. 305 In that case, a farmer named
Filburn sued Wickard, the Secretary of Agriculture, to enjoin enforcement of a marketing penalty
imposed under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 for the value of that part of his 1941 wheat
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crop that was available for market in excess of the market quota established for his farm. Filburn
argued that it was unconstitutional for the government to penalize him for the mere act of growing
wheat on his own farm.
The statute in question was a wacky New Deal effort to help impoverished farmers by
raising the price of wheat. In doing this, the New Dealers of course raised the price of bread to
urban and suburban consumers in the midst of the Great Depression. To artificially raise the price
of wheat, the federal government ordered farmers to grow less wheat in 1941 than they had grown
previously. In Filburn’s case, he was ordered to grow no more than 11.1 acres of wheat, but he
sowed 23 acres of wheat instead. He was penalized $117.11 for doing this. Filburn refused to pay
the penalty, arguing that Congress had no power to tell him what he could grow on his own land.
Filburn had in the past: 1) sold wheat; 2) fed it to livestock on his farm, which livestock he then
sold; 3) consumed with his family the wheat; and 4) set aside some portion for the following
seeding. Filburn did not disclose how he intended to dispose of the excess wheat he had grown,
so we must assume it was a farm good, produced on his own farm, for his own family’s personal
consumption.
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 says that “The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” 306 As far
as we are aware, no one has ever argued that Congress has the power to order foreign Nations or
the Indian Tribes not to grow wheat for their own consumption on their own land. Since Congress
has no more and no less power over commerce in the growing of produce “among the several
States” as it has over commerce with “foreign Nations” or “with the Indian Tribes,” it is quite
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simply irrational to conclude that the Commerce Clause could be legitimately invoked in support
of this law.
This brings us to the question of whether the relevant provisions of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938 are “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” the Commerce
Power. Here it might matter whether “necessary” means “useful” or “convenient” or “congruent
and proportional.”
The government argued in defense of its law that any home-grown wheat that Wickard
consumed on his farm depressed the price of wheat nationwide -- assuming one looks, as we agree
one should under governing doctrine, at all the home-grown wheat consumed in the United States.
The government this time expressly relied on the Necessary and Proper Clause. 307 Justice Jackson
said in his unanimous opinion for the Court in 1942:
“One of the primary purposes of the Act in question was to increase the market
price of wheat, and to that end to limit the volume thereof that could affect the
market. It can hardly be denied that a factor of such volume and variability as
home-consumed wheat would have a substantial influence on price ad market
conditions. This may arise because being in marketable condition such [home
grown] wheat overhangs the market and, if induced by rising prices, tends to flow
into the market and check price increases. But if we assume that it is never
marketed, it supplies a need of the man who grew it which would otherwise be
reflected by purchases in the open market. Home-grown wheat in this sense
competes with wheat in commerce . . . . This record leaves us in no doubt that
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Congress may properly have considered that wheat consumed on the farm where
grown, if wholly outside the scheme of regulation, would have a substantial effect
in defeating and obstructing its purpose to stimulate trade therein at increased
prices. 308
Justice Jackson’s “overhangs the market” rationale for this program breaks the barrier of
congruence and proportionality. It gives the federal government total power over all aspects of
life, subject only to the constraints of the Bill of Rights, since the argument can be applied to any
activity. The collapse of the concept of a market in intrastate commerce, and its replacement with
a national marketplace, means the federal government effectively has the power to regulate all acts
of buying and selling. If so, Congress could presumably pass a law regulating the prices charged
by prostitutes to their customers where prostitution is legal. Under Wickard v. Filburn, Congress
could also pass laws regulating sexual acts of friendly fornication on the ground that such sex
“overhangs the market” for prostitution. This is an absurd construction of the Necessary and
Proper Clause. It may be “useful” or “convenient” or “rational” for the government to regulate
home-grown wheat or sex between consulting adults in the privacy of their own homes, but it is
not “congruent and proportionate” to the exercise of any federal power for the government to do
so. Wickard v. Filburn is wrongly decided in such a profound way that it must be overruled once
one applies the correct standard for necessity.
The next prominent Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clause case which the Supreme
Court decided is Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States. 309
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race, color, religion, or national origin in places of public accommodation, including hotels and
restaurants. In this case, the Heart of Atlanta Motel was located in downtown Atlanta, near two
major highways, and approximately 75% of its guests were from out of state. Prior to the passage
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Black Americans, and even Black ambassadors from free nations in
Africa, found it incredibly hard to find hotel and restaurant accommodations in roughly one-third
of the United States where “whites only” policies were in place and enforced. This national
disgrace led to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which forbade all forms oof such
discrimination.
No one doubted that Congress could regulate the transportation of people across state lines;
that was clearly within the power to regulate interstate commerce. 310 But the commercial lodging
of those people after transit, while clearly commerce, was not so clearly commerce among the
several States. The Court nonetheless framed its ruling in favor of the law solely in terms of an
expansive view of the commerce power, 311 even though the Court quoted President Kennedy’s
proposed civil rights bill, which included specific reference to the Necessary and Proper Clause.312
Justice Black’s concurring opinion, however, recognized the importance of the Necessary and
Proper Clause 313 and found it more than adequate to support the law given the Shreveport Rate
Cases and a focus on the aggregate effects of racial discrimination on commerce. 314
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Darby, if one looks at the class of activity rather than any one activity in isolation, surely the result
would not change from formulating the inquiry as congruence and proportionality.
We have already seen how Katzenbach v. McClung, 315 a companion case to Heart of
Atlanta Motel, characterized McCulloch as establishing a rational basis test. 316 That was a needless
mistake. If Justice Black’s analysis of necessity was correct in Heart of Atlanta, it was just as
correct in McClung. These cases unfortunately continue the Court’s long-standing error of treating
matters as Commerce Clause issues when they are really Necessary and Proper Clause issues.
The other pre-Lopez case that might come out differently on a congruence-andproportionality standard is Perez v. United States. 317 Perez was convicted under a federal statute
prohibiting loan-sharking, which typically takes place on a street corner within the confines of a
single State. Congress nonetheless federalized it, on the theory that loan sharking was often
connected with organized crime, which had interstate effects. The Court agreed with this rationale
given the prior case law, 318 with Justice Stewart the lone dissenter. 319 Once again, the entire
discussion was framed in terms of the commerce power; the Necessary and Proper Clause was not
event mentioned. Nonetheless, no one thinks that street-corner loan-sharking is “Commerce
among the several States.” Rather, Congress and the Court thought that it might have a “substantial
effect” on such commerce. But the Commerce Clause is a Commerce Clause, not an Effects-onCommerce Clause. If Congress can reach activity that has an effect on commerce, it must be on
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the rationale of the Shreveport Rate Cases that such regulation is a permissible incident of the
commerce power. Once the question is posed that way, the causal links between federal power
and local loan-sharking become even more attenuated than in all the prior cases save Wickard. A
chain of reasoning from loan sharking to local organized crime to national organized crime to
regulation of interstate commerce might pass a rational basis test that is tantamount to a finding of
non-justiciability, but any more serious inquiry at least raises questions about the congruence and
proportionality of enacting federal criminal laws to deal with local street crime.
The Court drew a line in 1995 in Lopez by finding that Congress could not prohibit the
possession of guns within 1000 feet of a school – at least not without making a stronger showing
than it had about the connection to interstate commerce. Yet again, the Court cast its decision in
terms of the Commerce Clause, restating its case law to hold that Congress can use the commerce
power to “regulate the use of channels of interstate commerce . . . , regulate and protect the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate
activities . . . and regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.”320
That sounds just like the prior cases – except that Lopez limits the last category to regulation of
“an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could
be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.” 321
Lopez clearly should have been decided under the Necessary and Proper Clause, which the
majority nowhere cited. Under that clause, the same problems of congruence and proportionality
that plagued Perez would also infect the Gun Free School Zones Act. The Court would therefore
reach the same result, but would do so in a fashion truer to the actual constitutional provisions
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involved. We hope in future cases that the Court will use the congruence and proportionality
understanding of the Necessary and Proper Clause rather than the constitutionally dubious notion
of substantial effects on commerce.
There are, of course, many more cases that we could discuss, most notably including United
States v. Morrison, 322 Gonzalez v. Raich, 323 United States v. Comstock, 324 and National Federation
of Independent Business v. Sebelius. 325 But our goal here is not to provide a comprehensive
account of how we think the Court should decide cases. It is simply to show that replacing the
current rational basis standard for necessity with something far closer to original meaning, such as
congruence and proportionality, would not by itself make dramatic changes in the case law.
Indeed, the cases that would come out differently have probably already been limited to their facts.

VII. Conclusion

Today, the meaning of the term “necessary” is rarely debated, or even mentioned, in the
courts. Instead, the dictum of McCulloch is treated as canonically dispositive of the question,326
and attention turns to relatively implausible interpretations of “Commerce among the several
States.” However, the evidence uncovered in this analysis suggests that the original meaning of
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the word “necessary” was much narrower than the meaning Chief Justice Marshall attributed to it
– and certainly narrower than the meaning that case law over the past sixty years has given to it.
We aim to start a conversation rather than end it. This article does not attempt affirmatively
to establish the original meaning of the word “necessary.”

It only tests the specific linguistic

arguments on which the McCulloch decision rests. Our suggestion of reformulation in terms of
congruence and proportionality is tentative; it would take a separate article even to begin to flesh
out how that standard could be applied. In light of this article’s conclusion—that corpus linguistic
evidence does not support the Court’s reasoning in McCulloch—further research, employing
corpus linguistics and other methods, is necessary to explore the original meaning of the phrase
“necessary and proper.”
“Analysis of the Necessary and Proper Clause has historically begun and ended with
McCulloch.” 327 Perhaps it ought not end there.
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Appendix

A. Regression Analysis: Words of Qualification

The table below shows the results of a regression analysis. The dataset is composed of the
percentages of the occurrences of the relevant words—“necessary,” “needful,” “requisite,”
“useful” and “convenient”—that are qualified—by “more,” “most,” or “very”—in each timeframe
and each relevant corpus (for a total of 45 observations). There is no significant difference between
the percentages of the occurrences of “necessary” that are preceded by a comparative word and
the percentages of the occurrences of Maryland’s proposed synonyms that are preceded by a
comparative word. In other words, the difference cannot be distinguished from chance with 95%
certainty. However, there is a large and statistically significant difference between the percentages
of the occurrences of “necessary” that are qualified and the percentages of the occurrences of the
Supreme Court’s chosen synonyms that are qualified. In fact, using the percentages of the
occurrences of the word “necessary” that are preceded by a comparative word as a baseline,
Marshall’s synonyms are associated with a 17-percentage-point increase in the frequency of
“qualification,” with a standard error of 3 percentage points. Controlling for the corpus used and
timeframe analyzed leads to no observable change in the results.

Regression Analysis of Qualification by Comparison Words
(1)
(2)
0.008
0.008
Maryland’s
(0.03)
(0.03)
Synonyms
0.174***
0.174***
Marshall’s
(0.03)
(0.03)
Synonyms
Y
Timeframe
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(3)
0.008
(0.03)
0.174***
(0.03)
Y

Fixed Effects
Corpus
Fixed Effects

Y

B. Concordance Analysis Results

United States Examples (COFEA Corpus 1770-1786)
From George Washington to Brigadier
General William Maxwell, 2 October
1778

America's appeal to the impartial world

Acts of Connecticut 1776

Discourses delivered in Lyme, NorthParish, Lord's Day, January 26, 1783. /
By George Beckwith, A.M. Pastor of
the Third Church in Lyme

To George Washington from Major
General William Heath, 6 September
1776

From John Adams to the Duc de La
Vauguyon, 1 May 1781

Lord Stirling who is now in Jersey, and has the
general command of the troops there, will be a better
judge than I am of the necessary and proper
dispositions to be made. You will therefore
implicitly obey him, and either remain where you
are at present with your whole Brigade, or detatch
such a part of it as His Lordship may direct.
[G]ive and grant unto the said Governor and
Company, & c. that it shall and may be lawful for
them, & c. to erect and make all necessary and
proper judicatories; to hear and decide all matters
and causes . . . .
[A]nd do, and perform all the duties that are
necessary and proper for a Quarter - Master
General
But the apprehension of being eternally miserable
in the other world, strikes a dread on human nature,
and becomes a powerful restraint from sin. For who
can bear the thought of dwelling with devouring fire,
and everlasting burnings, without horror? Hence how
fit, how wise, how necessary and proper was it, for
the good of mankind in the legislature, to guard and
enforce obedience to his just laws, by annexing
eternal rewards to the obedience of merit and
demerit, since no other means could be powerful
enough to attain the end.
I was in Hopes this morning to have Given you Some
fresh Intilligence, but have not yet Receiv[ed] it but
Still Expect it, as we have undoubtedly a Spy on the
Island, Every necessary and Proper preparation
having been made for that Purpose the Last night . . .
.
By the Tenth Article of the Treaty of Alliance
between France and America, the most Christian
King and the United States agree, to invite or admit,
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other Powers, who may receive Injuries from
England, to make common Cause with them, and to
acceed to that Alliance , under Such Conditions , as
shall be freely agreed to and Settled between all the
Parties. . . . It is only proper for me to Say, that
whenever your Excellency shall have received his
Majestys Commands, and shall judge it proper to
take any Measures, either for Admitting or inviting
this Republick to acceed, I shall be ready in behalf of
the United States to do, whatever is necessary and
proper for them to do, upon the occasion.

England Examples (Hansard Corpus 1803-1819)
1805
House of Lords

1807
House of Commons

1808
House of Commons

1808
House of Commons

Lord Harrowby expressed his concurrence in the
opinion that a judge may be guilty of several acts,
besides those he may commit in his judicial capacity,
which would render his removal necessary and
proper; there were also several acts of a judge, on
which it may be proper to ground an address for
removal, and still not amount to a cause for the more
serious proceeding of impeachment
If the crisis called for such a measure, he was
convinced the militia colonels, who had already made
so many sacrifices in the service of their country,
would be willing to submit to this also; but, then,
they had a right to expect that the necessity of the
sacrifice should be proved: as the country also had a
claim to be satisfied, that it was necessary and
proper for the purposes of immediate defence to
begin by breaking up so large a portion of the
existing force
He understood, that in granting such licences to some
particular individuals, and refusing them to others,
much abuse had arisen, contrary to the true
meaning and intent of the legislature; he thought,
therefore, that information upon this subject would be
necessary and proper at any time to be laid before
the house, but more particularly at a period when
such an extensive system of blockade had been
adopted . . . .
Lord H: Petty wished the money to be given to his
majesty's ministers in the shape of a vote of credit, to
be by them applied according as they should find it
necessary and proper to make the advances: The
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1808
House of Commons

1813
House of Commons

right of either party to make peace, ought to have
been kept perfectly free . . . He had great satisfaction
in thinking that this money was advanced to Sweden
merely for the purpose of defending herself and
procuring peace, and not for the purpose of exciting
useless and destructive wars
And, this being incontrovertibly a general principle,
perfectly consonant to the law of nations, he
contended, that there never were circumstances
which more loudly called for its application, than
those in which this country stood in relation to
France and Denmark, when we took possession of the
Danish fleet: But, having gone thus far in justifying
the measure, he argued that the same reasons which
rendered it necessary and proper that we should
take possession of the fleet for a time, did not make it
either necessary or proper that . . . we should retain
possession of it in perpetuity
But if the right hon: gentleman had not come up to
his outline, he had called for no pledge which would
prevent any one from engrafting any amendment
thought necessary and proper on the ulterior
measure, and the more he heard this question
discussed, the more conscientiously was he
convinced, not only of its expediency, but of its
actual necessity: The motion before them only
acknowledged the principle, but bound them to no
detail, and, in concurring with these propositions he
considered himself as only doing that to which he
stood pledged by the opinions he had formerly
declared.
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